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Introduction
The end of  the Cold War brought with it the end of  the traditional, bipolar 
geo-strategic model of  explaining world affairs. “Feindbilder,” which used to be 
defined in geographical terms (“East” vs “West”), have been replaced by security 
threats perceived to be truly global and functional in nature, yet regional in origin: 
Terrorism and proliferation, migration, organized crime and corruption or, at the 
root level, the lack of  democracy and good governance in certain parts of  this 
world. The realization that in today’s globalized and interlinked world regional 
conflicts can have global fallout has increased the need for policy analysts to bet-
ter understand the highly complex nature of  different regional security dynamics. 
For policy makers, the question is how to address regional security issues effi-
ciently and effectively. 
In this context, regional security organizations such as NATO and the OSCE 
have recently been joined in their efforts to promote peace and stability by other, 
general-purpose or even economy oriented regional organizations. Such “secu-
ritization” of  agendas can be observed in the transformation of  the European 
Union and the development of  its CFSP and ESDP, in the change of  nature 
of  G7/8 summits, but also in the addition of  significant security related dimen-
sions to the agendas of  the Arab League, AU, OAS, ECOWAS, ARF and SADC, 
among many others. Regional security cooperation has thus become an increas-
ingly important part of  the larger debate on the “new regionalism,” and the ques-
tion of  how to coordinate national, regional and international actors now features 
as the key to successful regional integration and stability. 
During DGAP’s 9th New Faces Conference entitled “Security in a Globalized 
World: Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships,” participants 
from 18 different countries and from all over Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Rus-
sia and the US presented papers on how regional cooperation and strategic part-
nerships between states, regional and international organizations as well as civil 
society actors and the private sector contribute to enhance security. Divided into 
five panels, these case studies aimed at closing a gap in current policy research, 
which largely focuses on economic aspects of  regional cooperation, thereby ne-
glecting the above-mentioned “securitization” of  political and economic agendas, 
institutions and fora. 
The introductory panel gave a brief  overview of  recent trends in literature on 
and practice of  regional security cooperation.
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Panel II addressed the issue of  energy security, which now shapes the foreign 
policy of  states and results in strategic, if  sometimes uneasy, partnerships and 
alliances. Participants discussed ways to further coordinate energy security efforts 
and promote stable energy systems at both regional and global levels. 
Panel III focused on enlargement as the EU’s key instrument to project stability. 
Given the current enlargement fatigue and the ongoing debate about the EU’s 
limited absorption capacity, participants discussed the European Neighborhood 
Policy as a potential alternative instrument to promote security and stability in the 
EU’s neighboring and partner countries.
In Panel IV, participants discussed the role of  regional security institutions, 
strategic partnerships, alliances and other forms of  regional and international 
cooperation in Asia. They elaborated on the potential value-added of  actors such 
as ASEAN and its Regional Forum (ARF), the SAARC, the SCO and others vis-à-
vis single-state global actors such as China, Russia and the US.
The Middle East, a volatile region with few and only formally existing regional 
security institutions, took center stage in this conference’s final panel. Participants 
discussed the prospects of  the Barcelona framework, one of  the very few truly 
regional initiatives. Whether third party intervention could compensate for the 
apparent lack of  regional security cooperation, keeping in mind the limitations of  
the UN, the Quartet and the EU as potential actors in the region, was also highly 
debated. 
The 9th New Faces Conference was jointly organized by the International Fo-
rum on Strategic Thinking and the Norwegian Institute of  International Affairs 
(NUPI). It took place at NUPI’s premises in Oslo, Norway, on 20-22 Octo-
ber 2006. The academic program was complemented by social activities in and 
around Oslo, as well as a festive dinner and a keynote speech by Nils Morten 
Udgaard, one of  Norway’s outstanding foreign policy commentators.
The International Forum on Strategic Thinking is DGAP’s main instrument for 
promoting young professionals and scholars in the area of  foreign and security 
policy. It holds three major events per year: an International Summer School, 
a New Faces Conference and an Expert Conference. New Faces Conferences 
gather 20 promising young professionals and scholars pursuing an active career 
1  We would like to thank NUPI for organizing this conference with us, and especially Sverre Lodgaard and Elana 
Wilson for all their support, for sharing their insights and thoughts and for being wonderful hosts. We would also like 
to thank the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Norwegian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Ministry of  Defence and 
NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division for their financial support.
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in the field of  foreign and security policy. Participants present their own research, 
compare arguments and approaches, and share feedback and constructive criti-
cism through a forum of  like-minded peers. Their diverse academic and regional 
backgrounds create a stimulating atmosphere for open debate. This workshop-
style format allows participants to intensely engage with each other, get to know 
different perspectives and deepen their professional networks. Participants are 
encouraged to pursue their own ideas and thinking, reflecting their national back-
ground, work experience, academic education and area of  specialization.
Following the conference, participants are given time to consider their peers’ 
feedback and revise their work for publication through DGAP. This volume 
presents selected articles drafted by participants of  the 9th New Faces Conference 
and makes them available to the interested public. We hope that this volume will 
proof  to be a valuable contribution to the debate and literature on regional secu-
rity cooperation and encourage further research in this area.
Hans Bastian Hauck & Kathrin Brockmann
Participants of the 9th New Faces Conference gather at NUPI
 
New Faces Conference 2006 
Sverre Lodgaard and Fritjof von Nordenskjöld address the “New Faces”
Security in a  
Globalized World

 
New Faces Conference 2006
Security in a Globalized World: Towards Regional 
Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships
Foreword by Alyson J. K. Bailes, Director, SIPRI
The issue of  unilateralism versus multilateralism sometimes makes me think of  
the old fable of  the hare and the tortoise. The unilateralist hare, untrammeled 
by obligation or by slower brethren, leaps swiftly and sometimes even elegantly 
to his goal. The multilateralist tortoise has to totter along on not just four, but a 
monstrous multiplication of  legs (27 now in the EU, 26 in NATO), often trying 
to walk in different directions. The familiar twist of  the fable is that the tortoise 
may, through sheer dull persistence, nevertheless arrive closer to the target in the 
end. A nuance less often remarked on is that the tortoise’s natural protection is 
much tougher and more resilient than the hare’s.
Multilateral groupings of  the three basic different kinds—of  regionally contigu-
ous states, of  non-contiguous states, and (near-)global—have in fact shown an 
excellent survival rate since the Second World War. Compared with the pre-war 
period, disappearing institutions have been rather rare: an important recent 
exception is the windup of  the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (CMEA, also called COMECON) and a less important one is 
the mothballing of  Western European Union (since its active functions passed to 
the EU in 2000). Much more common have been the cases of  institutions enlarg-
ing themselves with strategically significant effect—ASEAN as well as NATO 
and the EU—and of  institutions with initially narrow competencies branching 
out into different fields. Multifunctionalism as well as multilateralism seems cur-
rently to be on the rise; and it is intriguing to note that cases of  initially economic 
or functional groupings branching out into security dimensions are easier to 
find than the reverse. (The purely military regional pacts CENTO and SEATO 
disappeared early in the post-war period, and neither the—otherwise remarkably 
durable—Western alliance NATO nor Russia’s Comprehensive Security Treaty 
Organization looks like breaking out of  its “hard” carapace any time soon.) Such 
a trend can be largely explained by the changing modern or post-modern concep-
tion of  “security,” which reduces the centrality and weight of  the military dimen-
sion to focus increasingly on issues at the interface of  defence and economics 
like proliferation, energy and environmental security. It may also be relevant that 
the most powerful understandings, and real-life versions, of  modern multilat-
eralism are those built on interpenetration between and common regulation of  
internal communities (the “integrative” model), rather than just traditional state-
to-state ties. If  “the family that prays together stays together,” the multilateral 
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group that spends resources and/or obeys laws together may be more likely to 
stand together and to obey a collective interest in the longer run. On this reading, 
recent attempts to revive a system of  bilateral trade deals would be just as much 
of  a false track as the more egregious cases of  use of  unilateral force.
Returning to the security agenda, it seems hard to deny that successful regional 
groupings have helped their members in many ways. They help to suppress risks 
of  conflict, to insulate any stubborn hotspots (like Northern Ireland), to design 
systems and mobilize resources against transnational threats like terrorism and 
natural hazards, and—increasingly often—to promote and consolidate good 
governance and reform, not only in the state apparatus. These blessings may 
more easily be counted by considering the many dangers and handicaps that face 
regions without effective cooperative frameworks, such as the greater Middle 
East, South Asia and North-East Asia (the China/Japan/Korea/Taiwan com-
plex). On the down-side, it is now better understood that even the most advanced 
groupings can suffer repeated crises of  confidence and disunity as collective 
competence is pushed out into newer and tougher areas; and the EU, as the most 
advanced model, has been the first but may not be the last to run into a barrier 
of  popular dissent and distrust.
Are there similar contradictions when it comes to the impact of  organized re-
gions and other specialized groupings on security and welfare at the truly global 
level? In the economic sphere, it can certainly be argued that regional groups 
which shelter their own members against some of  the pressures of  globaliza-
tion may intrinsically distort the overall workings of  comparative advantage and 
competition, besides holding the power to block as well as promote global trade 
negotiations. In security terms, however, there would seem to be clearer advan-
tages all round if  an increasing number of  regions can keep themselves peaceful, 
gradually pacify any “black sheep” in their midst, export the capacity to help out 
in other people’s crises, and develop models to minimize their exposure to uni-
versal transnational threats. Last but not least, does regional solidarity contradict 
the powerful twentieth-century idea of  voluntary strategic partnerships between 
larger and smaller powers from different continents who see their survival as 
inter-linked? This issue is being played out right now in the evolutionary contest 
between the EU and NATO, and there will no doubt be many twists and turns 
before the lessons are clear. This writer’s best guess is that it will grow steadily 
harder for the USA to sustain an incomplete, adversarial grouping in any given 
region (China’s neighbors against China or Iran’s neighbors against Iran), and 
easier to stabilize relations between any given outside power and a region that is 
Security in a  
Globalized World

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inclusive or “whole” in itself. The tortoise cannot mimic the hare’s style, but a 
little self-restraint could help to keep the hare alongside the tortoise.
No special justification is needed for a seminar and volume dedicated to explor-
ing these issues. Our theoretical models for understanding different modes of  se-
curity cooperation have failed to keep pace with the re-imagining of  security itself. 
The strength of  feelings, on both sides, about recent US excursions into unilat-
eralism (and occasional anti-institutionalism) has squandered energies that could 
have been spent on an objective study of  the outputs and outcomes, strengths 
and weaknesses of  various multilateral alternatives. It is a particularly interesting 
experiment, however, to try to make up some of  this lost ground by encouraging 
a younger generation of  thinkers—the “new faces” of  this publication—to tackle 
the subject at an early stage in their careers. At first sight, the vitality and con-
fidence associated with youth might seem closer to the drivers of  unilateralism. 
More significant, however, may be the facts that young thinkers deal more easily 
with degrees of  complexity that have baffled the preceding generation (whether 
in IR or IT); that they still have the generosity to look for everybody-wins solu-
tions; and that they are not easily discouraged from attempting the impossible. All 
those qualities will be needed if  an increasingly globalized, and threatened, world 
is to have any chance of  exploiting the full future value of  cooperation and part-
nership in all their forms. The present volume offers inspiration for tackling the 
task, and even more importantly, hope.
Elana Wilson and Kristin Haugevik from NUPI
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Recent Trends in Research on  
Regional Security Cooperation
Martin Sjögren
Introduction
In an increasingly globalized world, and with a global competitive market as well 
as the emergence of  transnational security threats such as terrorism and inter-
national crime, it is not surprising that cooperative frameworks have been estab-
lished in most regions in order to address these issues more effectively. Some 
form of  regional organization now exists in virtually every region, although the 
formal frameworks that exist in South Asia and the Arab region do not actually 
lead to much cooperation. There are, however, notable exceptions to this trend, 
such as the Northeast Asian region. 
As has been widely documented, regionalism experienced a resurgence during the 
1990’s and is now commonly termed “new regionalism”. The new regional orga-
nizations and already existing organizations that underwent further development 
were designed to deal with a steadily growing range of  issues. Although economic 
cooperation has remained the dominant issue for a lot of  these organizations, 
cooperation in the field of  security was a goal of  several of  them from the outset 
and has been a continuing development for others.2
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of  the term 
“region.” Geography is of  course an important determinant for the demarcations 
between various regions, with continents forming natural regional borders. As 
the current debate about the further expansion of  the European Union (EU) to 
countries such as Turkey reveals, however, these regions are also to a large extent 
political constructs. This is further demonstrated by the fact that some of  the 
larger world powers, such as the US, Russia, and China, play an influential role in 
several of  these regions simultaneously. 
This paper begins by discussing recent research on the topic of  regional security 
cooperation, of  its gaps and of  the efforts being made to fill them. The second 
part of  the paper addresses possible areas for future research, focusing on the 
1 See Louise Fawcett/ Andrew Hurrell (eds.). Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International 
Order, New York, 1995.
2 Significant security-related cooperation has also taken place at the sub-regional level, especially in Europe, Africa, and 
to a lesser extent in Latin America. It is assumed that much of  the analysis in this paper applies to both regional and 
sub-regional frameworks.
Martin Sjögren
Panel I – Regional Security 
Cooperation: Current trends
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question why regional security cooperation has failed to develop in some regions, 
paying particular attention to Northeast Asia.
Research on Regional Security Cooperation
There has been a significant amount of  research conducted on the theme of  
regionalism in international politics, as well as on regional cooperation. Although 
some of  this research was done during the Cold War, most of  it coincided with 
the so-called “new regionalism” of  the post-Cold War era. The majority of  this 
research has looked at economic cooperation and the role of  regional groupings 
in the globalized international political economy.
However, some research has also been conducted on issues of  regional secu-
rity. This research generally falls within one of  two categories. The first category, 
which was developed in the early 1990’s, focuses on regions as security entities 
within the international security system. This research has taken issue with Real-
ists, who tend to view states as the predominant actors in international relations, 
as well as Globalists, for whom states are losing their importance in an increas-
ingly globalized world. The new research emphasizes regions as primary arenas 
for security. Perhaps most important among these is the work by Barry Buzan 
and Ole Waever and their concept of  Regional Security Complexes (RSCs). The 
central premise of  their theory contends that the world is divided into a number 
of  regions, and that most security concerns and activities are internal to these 
regions rather than global in nature.
The second category of  research takes a different approach, focusing instead on 
specific regions and the security dynamics and patterns of  cooperation within 
them. Within this body of  research there is a substantial and growing amount of  
literature focusing specifically on regional security cooperation. This has been 
the case with Europe in particular, where much research has been carried out on 
the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as well as on other organiza-
tions such as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).5 Although this research 
provides a lot of  insight into security cooperation taking place in Europe, its 
contribution to the comparative understanding of  regional security cooperation 
 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. Regions and Powers: The Structure of  International Security, Cambridge, 200, chapter 
.
 See Pål Jonsson. The Development of  the European Security and Defense Policy: An Assessment of  Preferences, 
Bargains and Outcomes, Stockholm 2006, <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir1967.pdf>.
5 For a recent assessment of  the OSCE, see Pál Dunay. The OSCE in Crisis (Chaillot Paper no. 88), Paris 2006. <http://
www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai88.pdf>.
Trends in Research on Re-
gional Security Cooperation
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elsewhere in the world is limited because of  the peculiarities of  European organi-
zations—notably their advanced nature and multiplicity.
Indeed, recent literature on regionalism and regional cooperation lacks theoretical 
and comparative studies of  the forms and tasks of  regional security cooperation. 
This gap is unfortunate given the increasing involvement of  regional organiza-
tions in security affairs and the aspirations of  more distant regions towards devel-
oping such frameworks.
In an effort to bridge this gap in the literature, a series of  recent and forthcom-
ing publications by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
has sought to categorize the current forms of  regional security cooperation, as 
well as establish criteria for assessing the impacts of  various regional groupings.6 
There are four general patterns and functions of  regional organizations in the 
field of  security. Firstly, these regional organizations serve as frameworks for se-
curity dialogue for conflict prevention and management, either indirectly or more 
actively through the establishment of  field missions, as in the case of  the OSCE, 
or by sending peacekeepers, as in the case of  the African Union. A second 
general pattern is that regions have developed new forms of  military coopera-
tion, which place more emphasis on dialogue and cooperation than on traditional 
arms control. Examples of  this, such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
and ESDP, have developed cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance, 
peacekeeping, and even peace enforcement.
The third new pattern of  regional security cooperation has been a growing com-
mitment to the promotion of  democracy and human rights. This is perhaps most 
obvious in Europe, where a number of  organizations, such as the Council of  
Europe and the OSCE, actively work to promote democracy among their mem-
ber states. The European Union has also specified strict democratic requirements 
for membership, and has also made efforts to promote democracy beyond its 
borders. Promoting democracy among their members has also been an important 
task of  the Organization of  American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU), 
while other regional organizations, such as those in the Asia-Pacific, have been 
more cautious in this regard.
A fourth and final new trend in regional security cooperation has been the effort 
to address the so-called “new threats” encompassing the broader security agenda. 
Several of  the regional groupings have developed more comprehensive security 
6 Alyson J. K. Bailes and Andrew Cottey. Regional Security Cooperation in the Early 21st Century, SIPRI Yearbook 
2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford 2006; Bailes and Cottey (eds.). Regional Security 
Cooperation In the Twenty-first Century, Oxford, (forthcoming).
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concepts, attempting to address such disparate issues as energy security and vio-
lent non-state actors, particularly those involved in terrorism. Such cooperation 
can grow naturally out of  cooperation in the economic sphere, even for group-
ings with no previous specific security agenda. Examples of  this are the Mercado 
Común del Sur’s (MERCOSUR) and the Association of  South East Asian Na-
tions’ (ASEAN) policies on both terrorism and piracy.
Apart from these efforts to categorize the new patterns and functions of  regional 
security cooperation, recent research has also attempted to establish criteria for 
evaluating whether regional groupings have positive aims and effects. Although 
regional groupings such as the EU and NATO have generally had positive effects 
for their member states, this was considered necessary since other groupings, like 
the Warsaw Pact, have been largely detrimental for many of  their constituent 
members. Five such criteria have been suggested: whether cooperation is coerced 
and hegemonic; whether it is based on a zero-sum relationship with the out-
side world; whether it is rigid or static; whether it is artificial and superficial; and 
whether its management and resource use is inefficient. One region in which the 
newly formed regional groupings may have “failed” on several of  these counts 
is in the former Soviet Union. Groupings such as the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are to 
a great extent dominated by their larger member states (Russia in the case of  the 
CSTO, Russia and China in the case of  the SCO), have largely undemocratic prac-
tices and are often seen as trying to “block” US or Western strategic influence.
As has been demonstrated in this section, research relevant to regional security 
cooperation is being conducted (although not thoroughly enough) and efforts are 
being made to fill gaps in this research. But the research in this field still remains 
underdeveloped. The following section suggests possible areas that require fur-
ther exploration.
Further Research Areas
Despite attempts to address gaps in the research on regional security cooperation, 
much research still needs to be done in this important field in order to fully un-
derstand its implications and potential. As a starting point, all new security-related 
patterns and functions mentioned above need to be explored further, especially 
if  the roles and functions played by regional security organizations continue to 
develop in these areas. A number of  other possible research directions could be 
7 For an elaboration on these criteria, see A. J. K. Bailes and A. Cottey (fn. 6), pp. 215–218.
8 A. J. K. Bailes, Vladimir Baranovsky, and P. Dunay. Regional Security Cooperation in the Former Soviet Area, forth-
coming in: SIPRI Yearbook, 2007.
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pursued as well, such as the interactions between these regional groupings and 
the wider implications of  security regionalism for global governance.
One such area that requires further research, and which the rest of  this paper 
will attempt to address, is why regional cooperation has not taken root in certain 
regions or sub-regions. These under-regionalized areas often have plenty of  inter-
nal security problems, which in a globalized world have implications far beyond 
the region’s borders. Many examples can be mentioned in this regard, such as the 
greater Middle East, where organizations like the Arab League remain very weak 
and the Gulf  Cooperation Council is both weak and potentially divisive, and 
South Asia, where the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation  
(SAARC) has failed to develop into the effective regional organization many 
hoped it would.9 This section will, however, seek to explore this question in rela-
tion to Northeast Asia, where analysts increasingly speculate that security threats 
such as those posed by North Korea, as well as tensions among other states in 
the region, can only be addressed through institutionalized regional cooperation.10
Several factors may explain why certain regions have not been able to develop 
strong frameworks for regional security cooperation. Firstly, regions with a clear 
power discrepancy among their states have tended to develop weaker institutions, 
since the smaller states suspect that such an organization would be dominated by 
the larger state(s). This pattern holds true in Latin America, where the OAS has 
remained weak due to the overwhelming power of  the US, as well as in South Asia, 
where smaller states such as Sri Lanka remain wary of  the intentions of  the much 
larger India. NATO does, however, stand out as a notable exception to this trend.
Differences in size and power largely explain the problems with regional coopera-
tion in Northeast Asia. Most obviously, the size of  China makes other states in 
the region wary of  its intentions and possible influence. This has not only been 
the case with states such as Japan, but also with North Korea, for whom China 
remains the closest ally. North Korea has attempted to gain increasing indepen-
dence from China, largely due to lingering mistrust stemming from the perceived 
Chinese ideological betrayal through market liberalization and rapprochements 
with South Korea and the USA.12
9 For more on regionalism in South Asia, see A. J. K. Bailes (ed.), Regionalism in South Asian Diplomacy, SIPRI Policy 
Paper (forthcoming).
10 Zdzislaw Lachowski and Martin Sjögren. Confidence-building Measures on the Korean Peninsula during and after a 
Peace Process (forthcoming SIPRI publication).
 Bailes and Cottey (fn. 6), pp. 219–221.
12 Peter M. Beck and Nicholas Reader, China and North Korea: Comrades Forever? (Part 2), in: Korea and World Affairs, 
Summer 2006, pp. 201–27.
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The other power with disproportionate influence in the region is the USA, espe-
cially in relation to its allies South Korea and Japan. Tension has been growing 
here, too, especially between the US and South Korea due to the latter’s efforts to 
implement a more independent foreign policy. The discrepancy between the ap-
proaches of  both states towards dealing with North Korea, coupled with mount-
ing public discontent over the presence of  American military bases in South 
Korea, has caused the USA-South Korea alliance to come under increasing strain.
Another related factor that may explain the lack of  security cooperation in certain 
regions is adversarial intra-regional relations. Regions with low levels of  tension 
among their states have normally been more successful in establishing coopera-
tive security frameworks, as was the case in Western Europe following the Second 
World War. Conversely, regions with higher levels of  tension among two or more 
key players, such as South Asia and the Middle East, lack such frameworks. This 
explanation also applies to the case of  Northeast Asia. There is not only obvious 
tension between North Korea and almost all the states in the region. Territorial 
disputes are still very much alive, such as those between Japan and Russia over 
the Kurile Islands and between Japan and South Korea over Dokdo Island. In ad-
dition to this, a long-standing rivalry persists between Japan and China, stemming 
partly from historical events, but also from growing competition between the two 
states for regional supremacy.
As the experience of  the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) in the 1970s–80s demonstrates, however, such high levels of  tension 
may not necessarily be a barrier to developing security cooperation, as long as 
the region is clearly divided into two blocs. Although never to the same extent as 
in Europe during the Cold War, this may have partly been the case in Northeast 
Asia. Since the end of  the Cold War, however, tensions have emerged within the 
respective blocs. As we have seen, China and North Korea have been drifting 
further apart, especially since the revival of  international concern over North 
Korea’s nuclear policies. Relations between the USA and South Korea have also 
been weakening. This lack of  a clear bloc structure has made the region all the 
more complex, undermining efforts at building regional security cooperation.
Historical reasons may also explain the lack of  regionalism in Northeast Asia. 
Most importantly, the region does not have any past experience of  regional co-
operation. Relations between the states in the region, as in East Asia as a whole, 
have traditionally been conducted on a bilateral basis. Until now, the USA has de-
liberately cast its own key Asian relationships in that form. Although all states in 
the region (including North Korea) now take part in the meetings of  the ASEAN 
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Regional Forum (ARF) and most are members of  the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC) framework and the new East Asian Summit grouping, a strong 
commitment to the values of  regional cooperation has not yet taken root, and 
multilateral activities have hardly penetrated the spheres of  security and democ-
racy-building. Added to this lack of  experience of  cooperation is the historical 
legacy of  war and colonization in the region. Japan’s colonization of  the Korean 
Peninsula, as well as its invasion of  China during the Second World War, still 
cause tension. This is evident from the frequent disputes over Japanese textbooks, 
the issue of  Korean “comfort women,” and the tensions erupting over former 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s regular visits to the Yasukuni shrine.
Do all these negative factors indicate that Northeast Asia and regions with similar 
problems will likely fail in their efforts at regional security cooperation? The cur-
rent situation does not look promising, especially in light of  North Korea’s nu-
clear tests on October 9th, 2006. However, discernible trends in the region hint 
at a brighter future. Firstly, several states in the region have expressed the desire 
to establish such regional structures. This is most notably the case in China and 
South Korea, but more recently the USA has also made motions in this direction. 
Secondly, there are signs that bilateral relations between the states in the region 
may improve. The new Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, chose Beijing and 
Seoul as the destinations for his first official visits abroad, raising hopes that 
Japan’s relations with China and South Korea may improve. Indeed, if  anything 
Discussants Matthieu Briens and Kristin Haugevik follow Martin Sjögren’s presentation
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positive may come out of  the North Korean nuclear tests, it could be that states 
in the region will realize that regional cooperation offers the best hope of  ad-
dressing the common threat posed by North Korea. A new commitment to such 
cooperation was manifested by the relatively quick adoption of  United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea.
Regional security cooperation in Northeast Asia would greatly benefit both the 
region itself  and international security as a whole if  it follows the criteria outlined 
earlier as closely as possible. Threats emanating from the region, as well as from 
other under-regionalized regions such as the Middle East, have truly global con-
sequences, especially in the case of  nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, looking at 
the benefits other regions have gained from such cooperation, a framework for 
regional security cooperation seems like the most promising long-term solution 
to the region’s security problems.
Conclusion
The trend towards increased regionalism in world politics that arose during 
the 1990’s lost its momentum and appeal a couple of  years ago. The first Bush 
administration was in many ways outright hostile towards regional groupings, pre-
ferring to conduct its foreign relations bilaterally or through ad hoc “coalitions of  
the willing”. Furthermore, the most advanced of  the regional organizations, the 
EU, was in crisis following the failure to adopt its constitution. However, several 
recent developments seem to indicate that the trend is again turning towards 
increased enthusiasm for regional cooperation. Foremost among these develop-
ments is a change in US policy, as outlined in the revised National Security Strat-
egy of  March 2006, which expresses support for regional and global cooperative 
institutions. Moreover, the ESDP has continued to develop despite the lack of  
a European constitution. Other regional organizations have gained in popularity 
and influence as well. Both India and Pakistan have expressed interest in joining 
the SCO.
This revived enthusiasm indicates that regional cooperation is likely to continue 
to flourish and develop into an integral part of  the international system. As this 
paper has attempted to demonstrate, some research is currently being conducted 
on this topic. This research does, however, remain underdeveloped. It is there-
fore essential that it become the subject of  further research in order to improve 
understanding of  its various dynamics and impacts.
 The US National Security Strategy of  March 2006 states that “relations must be supported by appropriate institutions, 
regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching,” <http://www.whitehouse.
gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>.
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It’s a Long Way to … Regional Strategic Actorness.  
Assessing the EU’s Ongoing (R)Evolution in  
Strategic and Regional Affairs
Claudia Major
Introduction
For a long time, the European Union (EU) has been considered an economic 
giant but political dwarf. Yet at least since the inception of  the Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 199 and the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU aimed at establishing itself  as an actor in inter-
national politics, thereby striving to complement its economic weight with politi-
cal influence. This paper assesses the progress the EU has made in the realm of  
security and defense with regard to its ability to promote itself  as a strategic actor. 
It claims that despite criticism, draw backs and remaining challenges, the EU has 
considerably advanced in its development towards becoming a European strate-
gic actor.
1 I would like to thank the participants of  the 9th New Faces Conference in Oslo, October 2006, as well as Christian 
Moelling and Mike Adkins for their useful comments on earlier versions of  this paper.
Claudia Major
Opening Session with Fritjof von Nordenskjöld, Martin Sjögren, Sverre Lodgaard, Claudia Major 
and Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss
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The EU is a unique political entity in that it is less than a state, but more than 
an international alliance. CFSP and ESDP are located in the second, intergov-
ernmental pillar of  the EU. They are thus subject to unanimous decision-mak-
ing, which assures great influence of  the nation states.2 Given these particular 
preconditions, to what extent can the EU be expected to develop into a strategic 
actor capable of  unified and efficient actions? Moreover, how to assess the EU’s 
actorness? Is there not a self  fulfilling prophecy of  “non actorness” if  one tries 
to assess the EU’s strategic actorness with the help of  criteria usually applied to 
nation-states?
This paper first defines the terms of  analysis, that is, “strategy” and “actorness”, 
and outlines criteria to assess strategic actorness. Second, concrete achievements 
of  the EU will be discussed. The paper concludes with suggesting policy recom-
mendations on how to further the EU’s strategic development. 
Defining the Beast: What Strategy, What Actor? 
Strategy and strategic actorness are currently highly fashionable terms, and their 
sloppy and inflationary use easily obscures their meaning. The unique context of  
the EU as a political entity sui generis requires the thorough definition of  both 
terms with regard to the EU. 
Strategy 
The term derives from the Greek word strategos, which referred to a “military 
commander” during the age of  the Athenian Democracy. It describes a long 
term plan of  action designed to achieve a particular goal, as opposed to tactics or 
immediate actions. By defining the theory and practice of  the use and threat of  
the use of  organized force for political purposes, a “strategy” provides a bridge 
between political and military spheres. Beyond its military connotation, the term 
is now increasingly employed to describe the art of  developing, applying, and 
coordinating the instruments of  security policy, such as diplomatic, economic, 
military, and informational tools, to achieve objectives that contribute to the secu-
rity of  the issuing body.
Traditionally, strategies were double state-centred, in that they (1) focussed on 
defending state interests but neglected trans-national and intra-state security 
2 There are some areas in CFSP/ESDP where decisions can be taken with Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), such as 
the nomination of  Special Representatives or the implementation of  Joint Actions or Common Positions once they 
have been adopted.
 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: the logic of  war and peace, Cambridge 1987, p. 28 f.
 John Baylis, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, James Wirtz, Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic 
Studies, Oxford 2002; Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford 1999.
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issues, and (2) were issued by nation states. This was challenged by the grow-
ing importance of  collective security organizations, such as NATO, and forms 
of  political integration, such as the EU, that also issued strategies to define their 
security objectives and instruments.5 Applied to the EU, a strategy is here consid-
ered a “policy making tool, which, on the basis of  the values and interests of  the 
EU, outlines the long term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic 
categories of  instruments to be applied to that end.”6
Strategic actorness
If  a strategy is the art of  co-ordinating all economic, diplomatic, and military 
resources and policies available to an entity to achieve agreed goals, then, put sim-
ply, a strategic actor is the agent who emits and implements these strategies.
There are numerous attempts to define “European strategic actorness”, or “stra-
tegic culture” as precondition of  strategic actorness. Bretherton and Vogler 
define five criteria:
– shared commitment to a set of  overarching values and principles;
– the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies; 
– the ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international sys-
tem; 
– the availability of  and capacity to utilize policy instruments; 
– domestic legitimating of  decision processes, and priorities, relating to exter-
nal policy.
However, several authors have recently insisted that the ability to use and the 
actual use of  force are core elements of  actorness. Edwards and Cornish stress 
the “political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy 
military force, coupled with the external recognition of  the EU in the military 
sphere” as defining element of  a European strategic culture that paves the way 
for European actorness.9 For Matlary, strategic actorness requires that both crite-
ria—“the ability to threaten the use of  force […] and the ability to actually deploy 
such force”—are fulfilled.10 If  the EU is to be effective as foreign policy actor be-
5 Such as the NATO Concept (1999) and the European Security Strategy (200).
6 Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for a Positive Power, Aldershot 2005.
7 Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler: The European Union as a Global Actor, London 1999; Paul Cornish, Geoffrey 
Edwards, The strategic culture of  the European Union: a progress report, in: International Affairs, No. /2005, 
pp. 801–820; Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of  Force: the Evolution of  German Security Policy 1990–200, 
Manchester 200; Janne Haaland Matlary, When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?, in: 
Security Dialogue, No. 1/2006, pp. 105–121.
8 Bretherton, Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (fn. 7), pp. 8–2.
9 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of  the European Union (fn. 7), p. 806.
10 Haaland Matlary, When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible? (fn. 7), p. 112. 
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yond the candidate countries (over whom it has economic and political coercion) 
it must be able to deploy coercive diplomacy, which in fine includes not only the 
existence but precisely the deployment of  military force.
Drawing upon these definitions, three main criteria will guide the following 
analysis. A strategic actor can be assessed through (1) its capacities for strategic 
decision making; (2) the means at its disposal; and () the implementation of  
policies.
1) A strategic actor must dispose of  the capacities especially for: 
– common threat analysis
– decision making
– representation and negotiation
– implementation.
This enables for the formulation of  common policies (such as in form of  strate-
gic documents or ad hoc policy decisions) that are consistent with the common 
ground of  values and political priorities.
2) A strategic actor requires the means and resources to implement its strategies 
and decisions. This criterion assesses the availability of, and capacity to use, the 
relevant policy instruments available at the EU level, that is, civilian, police and 
military capabilities. Besides civilian crisis management tools, this includes the 
ability to threaten the use of  force, and to employ it.
) Is the EU able to implement its strategies? Put simply: is the EU able to act? 
Evaluating the implementation of  policies will offer pointers to assess the effec-
tiveness of  a strategic actor.
These three criteria will now be applied to the EU.
Is There Strategic Actorness? Assessing Recent Achievements of the EU  
The EU is a comparatively young actor in terms of  security. Although the Eu-
ropean Political Co-operation was already created in the 1970s, the EU only 
sharpened its foreign and security policy profile in the 1990s with the inception 
  It is worth mentioning that strategic actorness includes an internal and an external dimension. Internally, a strategic 
actor must be capable to develop, implement and monitor strategies and dispose of  the necessary resources for that. 
Externally, it must gain recognition as actor. This analysis focuses on the internal dimension. The external dimension 
can be assessed through an analysis of  its international / external recognition and perception.
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of  CFSP and ESDP. This witnesses not only the development of  the EU from a 
security consumer to a security provider. It also reflects the move from a mili-
tary dominated definition of  security towards a comprehensive security concept 
including social, economic and environmental dimensions—areas where the EU 
had experience and tools to offer, as compared to other international actors, such 
as NATO, or the nation states.12 To what extent can thus the EU be considered a 
strategic actor?
Capacities
With the inception of  CFSP and particularly ESDP, the member states intended 
to equip the EU with capacities of  strategic analysis, decision making, representa-
tion and negotiation. New institutional settings were created within the Council. 
This included the Secretariat General with its nine Directorates Generals; the ser-
vices located under direct authority of  the High Representative (HR), such as the 
Policy Unit and the EU Military Staff  (EUMS); decision-making entities run by 
the member states, such as the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Political 
and Security Committee (COPS); and the Secretary General/HR himself, Javier 
Solana. By putting at HR Solana’s disposal staff  and instruments for developing 
European positions and policies and for monitoring their implementation, the 
member states laid the basis for an increasingly unified European actorness.
In terms of  strategy, the first EU documents have been published by the Coun-
cil in 1999 on Russia and Ukraine.15 The development of  a general European 
security strategy however turned out to be rather controversial. Following the 
inception of  ESDP, the member states decided to push through those elements 
on which agreement could be found. Accordingly, institutional settings were built 
up and common military capabilities were envisaged. However, in view of  ongo-
ing dissent between member states on strategic topics, such as over the degree of  
autonomy the EU should strive for with regard to NATO and US, the strategic 
dimension was deliberately left vague.16 Once initiated, it was hoped, the ESDP’s 
“finalité” would become obvious from the context. However, far from that, the 
12 Sven Biscop, Rik Coolsaet, The World is at stage—A global security strategy for the European Union (Notre Europe 
Policy papers, No. 8/200), December 200, <http://www.notre-europe.asso.Fr/IMG/pdf/ Policypaper8.pdf>; Sven 
Biscop, The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for a Positive Power, Aldershot 2005.
 It is worth reminding that the Commission already disposed of  capacities and experience in some areas that the CFSP 
and ESDP now were to be responsible of, mainly crisis management.
 The first High Representative was nominated in 1999, at the Cologne European Council, Germany, see: Presidency 
Conclusions. Cologne European Council,  and  June 1999, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/
docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm> (01/02/2006).
15 European Council: Common Strategy on Russia,  June 1999, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/
com_strat/russia_99.pdf> (01/06/2006); European Council: Common Strategy on Ukraine, 11 December 1999, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/ukraine_99.pdf> (01/06/2006).
16 Alyson J. K. Bailes, The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History (SIPRI Policy Paper, N° 10), February 
2005; Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy (fn. 12).
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emphasis on capacities and types of  operation rather than policy goals created 
what Bailes labelled a “conceptual gap.”
It was only closed in 200 with the publication of  the European Security Strategy 
(ESS). Building upon a common threat analysis, the ESS outlines main objec-
tives, challenges and principles of  EU foreign action. However, it remains vague 
about how these should be achieved. While this allows the EU to maintain a 
wide margin for manoeuvre, it also threatens to render the ESS something of  a 
“strategic junk room.”19 Meanwhile, regional and sectoral strategies have further 
developed the ESS. For example, in 200 a “Strategy against the Proliferation of  
Weapons of  Mass Destruction”20 was adopted and in 2005, the British EU presi-
dency proposed an “EU Strategy for Africa.”21
Finally, the ESS also raised, if  only indirectly, the profile of  the Secretary General 
and his supporting institutions. The General Secretariat considers Solana’s inten-
sified travel agenda, as well as the broadened thematic and geographic diversity 
of  his engagements, to be the translation of  the ESS into every day political 
life.22 Moreover, thanks to its leading role in drafting the ESS, the Policy Unit 
positioned itself  as the coordinating body of  European strategic thinking. The 
member states became used to the idea of  the Council playing a role in foreign 
and security policy and to the idea of  “strategies” at the EU level, and “they were 
looking (more and more exclusively) to Solana and his team to produce them.”2
 Bailes, The European Security Strategy (fn. 16), p. .
 A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 200, <http://ue.eu.int/ 
uedocs/cmsUpload/7867.pdf> (01/01/2006). The unique context of  the genesis of  the ESS between Iraq war, 
looming eastern enlargement of  the EU and growing transatlantic divergences, such as in form of  the National 
Security Strategy of  the Bush government, as well as it unique drafting process, cannot be discussed here. For further 
details see Bailes, The European Security Strategy (fn. 16);  Erich Reiter, Die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU, in: Thomas 
Jäger, Alexander Höse, Kai Oppermann (eds.), Die Sicherheitsstrategien Europas und der USA, Baden-Baden 2005, 
pp. 57-65; Jean-Yves Haine, Idealism and power: The new EU Security Strategy, in: Current History, March 200, 
pp. 107–112; Klaus Becher, Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 200 European 
Security Strategy, in: European Security, Winter 200, Special Issue: Old Europe, new Europe and the future of  the 
transatlantic security agenda, pp. 5–59.
19 Claudia Major, Henning Riecke, Europe’s little blue book. More strategic debate in the EU, in: Internationale Politik—
Transatlantic Edition, No. 2/2006, pp. –51; Caroline Pailhe, Une Europe sûre dans un monde meilleur: Un concept 
stratégique utile mais dangereux (Note d’Analyse du GRIP, GRIP DATA : G2077), 6 January 200, via <http://www.
grip.org> (01/08/2005).
20 Council of  the European Union: EU strategy against proliferation of  Weapons of  Mass Destruction, Brussels, De-
cember 200, 15708/0, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en0.pdf> (01/02/2006).
21 Council of  the European Union: The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 19 December 2005, 
December, EU 15961/05 (Presse 67), <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/communications/docs/
the_eu_and_africa_towards_a_strategic_partnership_european_council_15_16_12_2005_en.pdf#zoom=100> 
(10/11/2006).
22 Major, Riecke, Europe’s little blue book (fn. 19).
2 Bailes, The European Security Strategy (fn. 16), p. 5.
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To sum up, with the integrated structures of  the Council, such as the Secretariat 
General or the EUMC, the EU disposes of  the institutional settings for common 
threat analysis and decision making. The ESS and other regional and sectoral 
strategies bear witness to this capacity. However, in their “broadness,” these 
strategies also mark the confines of  strategic thinking within the limits of  inter-
governmentalism and unanimity,2 a confinement also perceptible in the work and 
influence of  the institutions. Besides the unanimous decision-making process, 
the difficult balance of  power between the member states in institutions like the 
EUMC also impact upon the rapidity of  decision-making and limits the probabil-
ity that a common position be reached.
In addition, the development of  both the institutions and the strategic docu-
ments seems to be at least partly crisis driven, i. e. reactive but not pro-active. The 
Kosovo crisis helped putting the inception of  ESDP on the agenda. The Iraq 
crisis did not cause the ESS, but certainly encouraged the EU member states to 
think about common strategic objectives. 
Policy Means and Resources 
The inception of  ESDP, while the Kosovo war was still going on, reflects the 
agreement that the EU cannot do without its own military capabilities. ESDP 
was created in order to give the EU the “capacity for autonomous action, backed 
up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness 
to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”25 In December 1999, the 
member states agreed upon the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) which aimed at 
establishing a “European Rapid Reaction Force” composed of  60,000 troops, 
deployable in 60 days and sustainable for one year, to be operational in 200.26 It 
became quickly evident that the target would not be met, even if, in 2001, a more 
cautious and realistic time table had been established. The EU has since rede-
signed its guidelines for force structures and planning. In June 200, the Headline 
Goal (HG) 2010 had been drawn up, in which the EU stated its intent to develop, 
beyond the corps-size structure of  the HHG, small, self  contained and quickly 
deployable “battle groups.” These 1500 man strong units, to be deployable in 15 
days and sustainable for about 0 days, are fully operational since January 2007.27
2 There are some exceptions. Once a general agreement on the deployment of  a mission has been reached, particular 
aspects of  its implementation can for example be decided upon with majority voting.
25 Presidency Conclusions. Cologne European Council,  and  June 1999, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm> (01/02/2006).
26 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, <http://europa.eu.int/council/off/
conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm#external> and <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/
en/ec/ACFAC.htm> (01/02/2006).
27 Headline Goal 2010. Approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May and endorsed by the 
European Council of  17 and 18 June 200, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf> 
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In view of  improving intra-European co-ordination, the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) was set up in 200. The EDA should assist the EU in the devel-
opment of  defense capacities and strengthen the European defense industrial 
dimension. Beyond being an armament acquisition institution, the EDA should 
encourage the member states to make serious commitments in order to meet the 
HG 2010.28
In terms of  civilian capabilities, the EU defined, at the Feira European Council in 
June 2000, four main areas where capacities should be developed: police, judi-
ciary, civilian administration and civil protection.29 Most of  these requirements 
have been met. The civilian dimension is constantly evolving, as demonstrated 
for example by the inception of  the European Security and Intelligence Force 
(ESIF) in 2001. Composed of  up to 5000 police officers, the ESIF should be able 
to conduct preventive and repressive action in support of  international peace 
keeping missions.0 Another example is the adoption, in 200, of  the Civilian 
HG 2008, which defines targets regarding police force and civilian personnel. 
Its parallel formulation with the military HG 2010 underlines the comprehensive 
security approach of  the EU, linking military and civilian means.
To sum up, there are military, police and civilian capabilities at the disposal of  the 
EU. However, the translation of  political declarations into material capabilities is 
often not only slow but unsatisfying, as witnessed by the limited implementation 
of  the HHG. Ultimately, the strength of  the EU military capabilities depends 
upon the commitment of  the member states. In fact, there is a lot of  activity—
but very little result. Besides a lack of  political will, the soft governance mecha-
nisms in CFSP / ESDP—mainly the decision-making structure based on una-
nimity in the intergovernmental pillar and the lack of  sanctions mechanisms at 
the EU level—contributes considerably to this weak performance.2 In terms of  
capabilities, this eventually risks undermining the credibility of  the EU as a whole, 
in that the weak performance creates an increasing gap between the EU’s strate-
gic expectations on the one hand and available crisis management capabilities on 
(01/09/2006); Christian Moelling, EU–Battlegroups. Stand und Probleme der Umsetzung in Deutschland und für die 
EU, SWP Diskussionspapier, März 2007.
28 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of  the European Union (fn. 7), pp. 801–820.
29 Presidency Conclusions Santa Maria de Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000, <http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm> (15/01/2006). 
0 Rachel Bronson, When Soldiers Become Cops, in: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002, pp. 122–12; Graham 
Day, Christopher Freeman, Police-keeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of  Post-war Iraq, 
in: International Affairs, No. 2/200, pp. 299–1, p. 1.
 Civilian Headline Goal 2008, Brussels, December 200 <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/0/st15/st150-
re0.en0.pdf> (01/10/2006).
2 Christopher Reynolds, All Together Now? The Governance of  Military Capability Reform in the ESDP (College of  
Europe Working Paper Series, No. 1), Bruges, October 2006.
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the other. Needless to say that the late development of  a strategic document (ESS 
in 200) did certainly not help to improve civilian and military capacities: without 
a raison d’être and a goal, it is difficult to raise awareness, credibility and commit-
ment from the member states. Finally, also the development of  military capaci-
ties seems partly crisis driven, with the call for military capacities arising during 
the Kosovo War. This emphasizes once again the reactive nature of  EU strategic 
development. 
Implementation
Actorness requires the implementation of  the agreed policies with the help of  es-
tablished means. Since the first EU mission Concordia, launched in March 200 
in Macedonia, the increasing number of  missions witnesses the international 
presence of  the EU, even if  it does not always equal international recognition 
of  actorness as such. The EU has successfully carried out civilian and military 
missions, the latter as well with recourse to NATO assets as agreed upon in the 
“Berlin Plus” agreement (such as Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina), as on an 
EU-only basis (such as Artemis in DR Congo in 200). Current EU missions 
reflect the implementation of  the EU’s foreign policy priorities as outlined in the 
ESS: such as the support mission to the police force in the Palestinian territories 
(EUPOL COPPS) or the mission to train Iraqi judges, prosecutors and security 
forces (EUJUST LEX). The mission Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, taken 
over by the EU from NATO in 200, reflects again the EU’s commitment to link 
the military and civil dimensions of  its conflict management capabilities.
EU missions have been of  growing significance in that more and increasingly 
various tasks have been accomplished. Eighteen missions have been carried out 
or are currently in place, covering the whole range of  civilian, police and military 
operations. Moreover, they are significant in that a “greater sense of  responsi-
bility for the EU as a credible strategic actor” has emerged, thus also boosting 
the self-confidence of  the EU. Each mission represented an opportunity to 
“improve policy-making capacity, to achieve greater consistency and coherence 
in integrating the EU’s different policy instruments, and to ensure a consensus 
among all member states“.5
However, the successful implementation of  EU actions is conditioned by the 
intergovernmental decision-making structure as much as by diverging expecta-
tions of  the member states. The hesitancy among the member states about sup-
 EU operation as end of  May 2006:  <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDPoperations.jpg> 
(01/10/2006).
 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of  the European Union (fn. 7), p. 807.
5 ibid.
 
New Faces Conference 2006 
Panel I: Regional 
Security Cooperation
porting the UN mission in DR Congo for the elections in summer 2006 shows 
that the sole existence of  a strategy and of  military and civilian capabilities does 
not automatically lead to action.6 Preceding strategic deliberations such as in the 
Africa strategy or the ESS might have made it easier to consider EU involvement 
in Africa. But it also means that the African states and the UN could take the EU 
by its word and demand greater engagement. The Congo mission exemplifies that 
the sole existence of  institutions, strategies and resources does not automatically 
increase the sense of  responsibility of  the member states, nor does it accelerate 
or improve the decision-making at the EU level and the interaction of  the EU 
with national levels.
This analysis leads to an ambiguous conclusion. On the one hand, the EU seems 
to be a rapidly developing and constantly improving strategic actor. It disposes of  
strategic guidelines in form of  the ESS and other regional and sectoral strategies. 
It is equipped with the institutional settings to decide, implement and monitor 
policies. It possesses an increasing set of  military, police and civilian capacities. 
Finally, the EU is present as actor in some regions, such as in the Balkans.
However, even if  the EU does play a significant role in some areas, its influence 
on critical issues of  international politics, such as in the Middle East, remains lim-
ited. As Edwards and Cornish put it, the EU’s commitment “is comprehensible 
in declaratory terms, but not in implementation.” Its performance as well as its 
perception as strategic actor are in fact rather limited. A fully fledged actor entails 
not only the existence of  institutional and material capacities and capabilities but 
precisely their rapid, credible and efficient applicability and application. This is 
rarely the case for the EU, as reflected by the ongoing shortfalls in military and 
civilian HGs or painfully long decision-making processes, such as regarding the 
EUFOR Congo.
As identified above, one major obstacle to cooperation and effective action seems 
to be the persistent lack of  political will of  the member states. It is illustrated 
by their persevering reluctance to move beyond intergovernmental co-operation 
as well as by their inability to reconcile EU capabilities with rhetoric of  strate-
gic actorness. As Gross and Giegerich point out, the main dilemma for the EU 
lies in the conflicting demands for efficiency (as actor) and legitimacy (required 
for actions).9 For them, the core problem is a dual inefficiency at the EU level: 
6 Major, Riecke, Europe’s little blue book (fn. 19).
 ibid.
 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of  the European Union (fn. 7), p. 806.
9 Bastian Giegerich, Eva Gross, Squaring the Circle? Leadership and Legitimacy in European Security and Defence 
Cooperation, in: International Politics, No. /2006, pp. 500–509. 
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ineffective national solutions on the one hand and non-existing supranational 
solutions at the other hand. The existing intergovernmental solution in form of  
CFSP/ESDP has so far proved unsatisfactory since it has avoided tackling the 
question of  efficiency and legitimacy. If  the consensus and unanimity required in 
CFSP/ESDP provided legitimacy, the costs of  such are reduced efficiency.0 This 
raises the thorny question whether – in order to improve efficiency—the input 
into CFSP/ESDP decisions ought to be a function of  a country’s contribution, 
be it in terms of  money or troops.
Where Do We Go From Here? Policy Recommendations to Further European Strategic 
Actorness42
How can the EU improve its strategic actorness? In a first step, the EU needs 
to address the “old” question of  what international role it wants to play in what 
particular scenarios. The EU should not limit itself  to a unique role, but rather 
define how it will react under which circumstances. This requires a further defini-
tion of  “European interests,” as called for in the ESS. Only then can a sense of  
European togetherness emerge. The above outlined weaknesses are originated at 
both national and EU levels. Both are addressed in the following recommenda-
tions:
EU needs to further develop existing strategy
The EU’s regional and sectoral strategies require further refinement. The painful 
debate about whether and how the EU should engage in the DR Congo proved 
that regional strategies are not sufficiently developed. Closely linked: the EU 
needs to discuss its priorities and criteria for regional stability missions.
Go ahead even without the Constitutional Treaty (CT)
The CT addressed a major weakness of  EU actorness, that is, the intergov-
ernmental decision-making structures based on unanimity. The member states 
should strive for strengthening the EU’s and Solana’s role independent from the 
future of  the CT. In order to enhance Solana’s leadership role, he could receive 
more influence on the CFSP agenda, in defining policy and he could be given 
more responsibility for dialog with partners. More generally the soft governance 
rules in CFSP/ESDP need reform. So far, the required consensus and unanim-
ity provide legitimacy, but at the cost of  reduced effectiveness. How to conciliate 
0 ibid.
 Giegerich, Gross, Squaring the Circle? (fn. 9); Steven Everts, Berlin-Paris-London, in: Alfred Pijpers (ed.), On Cores 
and Coalitions in the European Union: The Position of  Some Smaller Member States (Clingendael Institute), The 
Hague 2000, pp. 15-2. 
2 This section strongly draws upon Major and Riecke 2006 (fn. 19) and further develops their argument. This note shall 
serve as reference for the whole section.
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leadership and legitimacy? It is worth discussing, as raised by Evert and Gross & 
Giegerich, whether the input into CFSP/ESDP decisions ought to be a function 
of  a country’s contribution, be it material or financial.
Create capabilities
The EU must display convincingly to its partners and the outside world that it 
wants to act and has the capabilities and capacities to do so. The implementation 
of  the military HG 2010 and the civilian HG 2008 is one step. The EDA assists 
in co-ordinating member states’ procurement and joint projects. However, it has 
no leverage to urge reluctant governments to live up to their promises. Eventu-
ally, the ability to fulfil the EU’s capability needs lies in the hands of  the member 
states.
Enhance co-operation
Strategic debate is not worth much if  it does not lead to co-ordination of  EU 
instruments and between the member states. Cross pillar co-ordination is needed, 
for example on security, trade and development, as well as on migration and law 
enforcement. All European actors—governments, representatives of  council, 
commission and parliament—must be involved in the strategic development. The 
Civil-Military-Cell, composed of  personnel from different EU agencies as well as 
the member states, is a good example for such a co-ordination.
Increase member states commitment
The member states are key to the development of  a European strategic actorness. 
Solana cannot run CFSP/ESDP alone; he needs the commitment of  the member 
states to turn indifference into attention and action. Just as the UK and France 
have put Africa on the agenda, other states can shape strategies of  regional or 
sectoral engagement. With regard to the national level, governments need to up-
date their security concepts and policies and put them into perspective with EU 
documents. The Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, issued by the German 
Federal Foreign Office in 200, refers to the ESS. Furthermore, national govern-
ments need to identify their defense needs on the basis of  the EU threat assess-
ment, define the levels of  ambitions for participation in EU missions, and specify 
their contributions.
Conclusion
Several criteria corroborate the initial hypothesis that the EU has considerably 
advanced in developing its strategic actorness. The EU disposes of  a strategy, 
 Giegerich, Gross, Squaring the Circle? (fn. 9).
 Wim van Eekelen: From words to deeds. The continuing debate on European Security (Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of  Armed Forces), Brussels/Geneva 2006, p. 292.
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institutions and decision making capacities, of  increasing civilian, police and 
military capabilities, and is worldwide involved in civilian, police and military mis-
sions. On the other hand, its slow decision-making process, the ongoing short-
falls in the material dimension and the lack of  presence in important issues of  
international politics, eventually reveal the lack of  international recognition and 
ultimately point to the limits of  European strategic actorness.
It would, however, be too easy to dismiss the EU’s strategic actorness so quickly. 
It is worth reminding that the EU’s strategic development only seriously took off  
with the inception of  ESDP (1999), less then seven years ago, with the first mis-
sions being carried out only in 200. As a very young actor, the EU has not only 
to develop and get used to its tools, but it also has to compete with long estab-
lished actors, be it the nation states or international organizations such as NATO. 
The strategic development of  the EU cannot be assessed without taking into 
account its partners, and in particular, the transatlantic ties. In fact, one reason 
why the EU actorness is so quickly dismissed is that the criteria used to assess its 
accomplishments might not be adapted to evaluate the EU and might therefore 
generate unreasonable expectations. For example, the EU does not strive to be-
come a defense organization (at least not yet). Consequently, a comparison with 
NATO is potentially little meaningful if  not misleading. The question should 
rather be: what can the EU reasonably be expected to be?
As it stands now, the EU will only be a supplementary foreign policy tool for the 
member states, it will not replace national policies and actions. Since the member 
states remain reluctant to confer greater power to the EU in the sensitive realm 
of  security and defense, the decision-making at the EU level is confined to una-
nimity with its inherent limits. If  the main obstacle is thus a lack of  political will, 
one possibility to develop the EU into a more relevant strategic actor would be to 
impact upon the very logic of  the nation states’ strategic interests.
Thus, how to raise the interest of  the member states to act through the EU 
framework or to further confer responsibilities to the EU level? The challenges 
that the member states face today are not longer solely national and territorial, 
and it is increasingly difficult to tackle them on a solely national basis. So the in-
terest of  the nation states in acting through the EU framework with access to the 
extensive EU tool box might increase as it offers additional means and opportuni-
ties.5 For example, military interventions have become increasingly risky, just as it 
is ever more difficult to gain domestic support for them. In fact, it is the ongoing 
5 Haaland Matlary, When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible? (fn.7).
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development of  the international security environment itself  that might make act-
ing trough the EU framework increasingly attractive for the EU member states.
Eventually, the success of  the EU in strategic terms depends upon the commit-
ment of  the member states. That they were able to agree on a common strategic 
paper (i. e. the ESS) demonstrates that the EU started to think in global terms; and 
that member states are starting to engage with challenges beyond their reach, their 
available means and strategic horizon. The adoption of  the ESS affirms the EU’s 
ambition to make a proper mark on the course of  global events in what Mark 
Leonard calls the emerging “New European Century.” According to him, the 21st 
century will be a European one, not because “Europe will run the world as an 
empire, but because the European way of  doing things will become the world’s.”6
However, this vision will only materialise if  the EU convincingly turns ambitions 
into actions and lets deeds follow words. Strategy is the implementation of  objec-
tives, based on an outline and enabled by the appropriate means. Consequently, 
implementation is also the ultimate test of  a strategy. To keep the EU’s strategic 
(r)evolution alive, the EU should above all assure the implementation of  its cur-
rent level of  ambition. This may include disappointments, sometimes even failure, 
which may raise political concerns about the EU’s capacity as appropriate agent. 
But it may also allow for learning, evidence based adoption of  strategies, and a 
growing record of  serious achievements, recognized by internal critics as well as 
by the international community. Any other approach is a dead end on the way 
towards strategic actorness.
6 Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st Century, London 2005, p. 1. 
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A New Strategic Partnership?  
Deepening UN-NATO Relations
Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss
“As we enter a new century of  challenges and inevitable crises, it is critically important for 
us to draw on each other’s strengths in pursuit of  peace and security.” 
(Kofi Annan, 1999)
The threats and challenges posed by today’s security environment are so complex 
that no single state or international organization can tackle them all by itself. Ac-
cordingly, the question of  how to build new ties between key international institu-
tions has emerged as a major issue in the current international security debate. As 
two of  the world’s most important security providers, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) could benefit greatly from a 
more structured relationship.
Historical and Strategic Background
During the Cold War period, UN and NATO almost did not co-operate at 
all—their functions and responsibilities were significantly different. What is more, 
their perceptions of  each other were largely negative. NATO, as one of  two rival 
military alliances in Europe, was regarded in UN circles as being part of  the 
problem of  high arms expenditures and confrontational policies rather than be-
ing a guarantor for peace and security. The UN, on the other hand, was perceived 
by some NATO members as politically ineffective due to the stalemate in the 
UN Security Council (UNSC), and militarily irrelevant to the collective defence 
arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic Area.2
The dramatic events in the early 1990s changed all that. They brought about a 
very different security environment which forced international organizations in-
volved in peace-building to rethink their strategies. Traditional East-West tensions 
were replaced by security challenges that were much more multifaceted in na-
ture. They included terrorism and proliferation of  weapons of  mass destruction 
(WMD) as well as trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms. Conflicts between 
states decreased, but violent internal conflicts multiplied. Some of  these threats 
1 Statement by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan at NATO headquarters, 28 January 1999,  <http://152.152.96.1/
docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm>.
2 Derek G. Boothby, Background Paper, in: IPA Seminar on UN/NATO Relationship: Co-operation between the UN 
and NATO: Quo Vadis?, New York, 11 June 1999. Martin A. Smith, At Arm’s Length: NATO and the United Nations 
in the Cold War Era, in: International Peacekeeping, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 56–7, p. 56.
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were not new, but they had gained an unprecedented global dimension which 
seriously affected national security and international stability.
The new strategic environment also demands more complex forms of  peace-
keeping. Going beyond security in the narrow military sense, peacekeeping today 
encompasses political reconciliation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegra-
tion (DDR), governance, economic regeneration and development. The aim is to 
create reliable domestic institutions and stable conditions which prevent coun-
tries from relapsing into conflict. This also means that engagement has to be long-
term. In a speech at NATO headquarters in January 1999 UN Secretary General 
(SG) Kofi Annan stressed this point, saying: “No one […] can expect our future 
tasks to be easy in execution or short in duration.”
As the diversity of  the task has grown, so too has its quantity. Over the past 
decade, the demand for the UN to undertake peacekeeping operations has 
multiplied and the number of  peacekeeping operations has increased more than 
four-fold. Whilst only 1 operations were established in the first 0 years of  the 
UN’s history, 7 missions have been conducted since. There are currently more 
than 90,000 personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations.5
For NATO, the post-Cold War changes were equally profound. As the major 
challenges for transatlantic security would increasingly emerge in regions beyond 
Europe, NATO had to be enabled to address these challenges wherever they 
originated. As a result, NATO gradually shed its traditional “eurocentric” focus, 
and shifted towards the conduct of  out-of-area operations ranging from combat 
to peacekeeping operations, and from training to humanitarian relief. Accord-
ingly, NATO also transformed its military forces. For example, it developed rapid 
reaction forces that could be deployed over long distances and sustained over 
extended periods of  time. The UN, on the other hand, had to realize that it was 
no longer able to address crises on its own—it needed to find suitable partners. 
This was the starting point for co-operation with NATO.
Co-operation to Date
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Practical co-operation between the UN and NATO began in 1992, when the Al-
liance decided to support the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, thus ac-
 Eirini Lemos-Maniati, Peace-Keeping Operations: Requirements and Effectiveness; NATO’s Role (NATO Academic 
Forum Report), June 2001, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/lemos-maniati.pdf>.
 Statement by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan at NATO headquarters, 28 January 1999, <http://152.152.96.1/
docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm>.
5 United Nations Peacekeeping. Meeting New Challenges, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>.
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tively entering the field of  peacekeeping and conflict management. This decision 
constituted a revolutionary break with previous NATO policies, as the Balkans 
produced many more “firsts” for the Alliance: the first out-of-area deployment, 
the first peacekeeping operation and the first significant co-operation with other 
international organizations. Initially, NATO ships monitored operations in the 
Adriatic in support of  a UN arms embargo against all republics of  the former 
Yugoslavia.
This readiness of  the Alliance to support peacekeeping operations under the 
authority of  the UNSC was officially expressed by NATO Foreign Ministers in 
December 1992. Alliance members indicated that they were ready to respond 
positively to further UN enquiries for NATO assistance. Subsequently, co-opera-
tion was extended including, inter alia, maritime and air operations, close air sup-
port for the UN Protection Force and air strikes to protect UN “Safe Areas.”
In its 1999 Strategic Concept, the Alliance repeated its offer “to support, on a 
case-by-case basis, and in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and 
other operations under the authority of  the UNSC […], including by making 
available Alliance resources and expertise.”6 Although NATO does not want to 
serve as toolbox to the world organization, it is prepared to act within the pa-
rameters of  the sub-contracting model. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer reiterated this offer in his address to the UNSC in November 200. 
Until 200, the Alliance helped maintaining a secure environment and facilitating 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reconstruction. During this time NATO forces worked 
closely on the ground with other international organizations, including those of  
the UN, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and the UN International Police Task Force.
Today, NATO continues to assist Bosnia in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. For ex-
ample, it has maintained a military headquarters in the country to help it with the 
reform of  its defence structures and its eventual accession to NATO’s Partner-
ship for Peace programme. The Alliance also remains in close contact with UN 
representatives, with whom it discusses a wide range of  issues such as civil-mili-
tary co-operation, detention and DDR.
6 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/stratcon.htm>, para. 1.
7 Dick Leurdijk, NATO and the UN. The Dynamics of  an Evolving Relationship, in: RUSI Journal, No. , June 200, 
pp. 2–28, p. 27.
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Kosovo
The Kosovo crisis and the Alliance’s 78-day air campaign constitute a significant 
chapter in UN-NATO relations. For one year, the international community had 
watched internal fighting, which culminated in massive human rights abuses and 
crimes against humanity. After all diplomatic means had been exhausted, NATO 
decided to launch an air campaign to force the Serbian authorities to abort their 
ethnic cleansing. The UN had been unable to act or even to formulate a UNSC 
Resolution, due to a stalemate caused by Russia. Hence, NATO was forced to ap-
ply force without UN mandate. This put it into a serious political, moral and legal 
dilemma and caused one of  the most controversial debates in NATO’s history.
Since the vital national interests or physical security of  NATO’s member states 
were not directly threatened by the ethnic violence in Kosovo, the Alliance was 
not able to justify the use of  force as an act of  self-defence. Instead, it inter-
vened explicitly on humanitarian grounds, knowing that this was the only way to 
halt a humanitarian catastrophe. Being an alliance of  values, NATO was ready to 
defend peace and security not only for its own members but within the whole of  
Europe. The morality of  the intervention was thus stronger than the problem of  
not being mandated by the UN.
The UN’s reaction to NATO’s autonomous action was twofold: SG Kofi Annan 
stressed that the UNSC was the sole source of  legitimacy on the use of  force. 
With equal emphasis, however, he stated that there were “times when the use of  
force may be legitimate for the pursuit of  peace.”9 When international action was 
urgently needed in Kosovo, the SC failed to unify these two elements due to the 
above-mentioned stalemate. As NATO’s intervention was designed to restore 
peace and security and defend human rights, the Allies considered it acceptable.
Generally, however, the UN demands that the fact that it is the only power that 
can authorize the use of  force be recognized by all its members. All other paths, 
it fears, might lead to anarchy.10 This is why the Alliance’s ongoing demand to 
decide autonomously on the use of  force is frequently criticized within UN 
circles. Even though the Alliance accepts the UNSC’s primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of  international peace and security, it is not willing to regard this 
as an exclusive right. Instead, it retains the right to decide autonomously on the 
8 Legally, NATO is a collective defence system as defined under Article 51 of  the UN Charter. This article allows the 
use of  force without UN mandate, as part of  self-defence (United Nations Charter, <http://www.un.org>).
9 UN SG Kofi Annan’s speech in The Hague, 18 May 1999 (UN Press Release SG/SM/6997).
10 Ibid.
 Leurdijk, UN Reform and NATO Transformation: The Missing Link (Netherlands Institute of  International Organi-
zations, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, No. ), October 2005, pp. 6 and .
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use of  force, without a formal authorization by the SC. This is not justified with 
NATO’s character as a collective defence organization, but rather with its self-
perception as a contributor to collective security and as a community of  values.
Following NATO’s air campaign in April 1999, the UNSC passed Resolution 
12 which established NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), through which it contin-
ued its engagement in the region. NATO’s future involvement will depend on the 
outcome of  the Kosovo status talks and on the security situation following the 
settlement. What is already clear, though, is that NATO’s military and political 
presence will be maintained for some time to contain any possible outbreaks of  
violence.
Afghanistan
In August 200, NATO assumed command of  ISAF—the International Security 
Assistance Force. This is the first NATO-led peace-support operation, far away 
from its own territory and far outside the Euro-Atlantic area. ISAF is an Article 
VII operation and could be taken as an example of  NATO serving as sub-con-
tractor to the UN. Each step of  NATO’s expansion from Kabul into the regions, 
a presence that now covers the whole of  Afghanistan, required a UNSC mandate. 
So did the establishment of  NATO’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).
From the beginning, a close partnership existed between UNAMA (UN As-
sistance Mission in Afghanistan) and NATO-led ISAF. Every three months, 
NATO’s chief  commander sends a report to the UN SG informing him about 
the latest developments in the country. NATO also has a Senior Civilian Repre-
sentative who is located in Kabul. He carries forward the Alliances political-mili-
tary objectives, liaising with the Afghan government, civil society and of  course 
representatives of  UNAMA. As in the Balkans, UN and NATO representatives 
discuss a wide range of  topics. These include drugs, terrorism, civil-military co-
operation, disarmament and reintegration as well as elections and the build-up of  
democratic structures.
Iraq
In Iraq, under the terms of  the UNSC Resolution 156 and at the specific request 
of  the Interim Iraqi Government, NATO is providing assistance in training and 
equipping the Iraqi security forces. NATO and the UN, which had both suffered 
a severe internal crisis as a result of  the Iraq controversy, each decided to engage 
in Iraq in this way. It allowed them to help create peaceful and stable conditions 
in the country without engaging in the actual conflict.
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Darfur
NATO also provides logistical assistance to the African Union’s (AU) UN-en-
dorsed peacekeeping operation in Sudan. In response to the deteriorating situa-
tion in Sudan’s Darfur region, the AU asked NATO in April 2005 for logistical 
support for its mission (AMIS). This included the co-ordination of  strategic 
airlift support for the deployment of  AMIS units as well as staff  capacity build-
ing. On several occasions, NATO expressed its readiness to support a possible 
future UN mission in Darfur.
Pakistan
In October 2005, in response to a request from Pakistan and UNHCR, NATO 
launched an operation to assist the relief  effort following a devastating earth-
quake. NATO airlifted supplies donated by NATO member and partner coun-
tries as well as by UNHCR to the troubled region. In addition, it deployed engi-
neers and medical personnel from the NATO Response Force (NRF). To address 
this humanitarian crisis as effectively and quickly as possible, NATO’s Disaster 
Response Co-ordination Centre co-ordinated closely with relevant UN agencies.
Looking at these operations, it can be said that UN-NATO co-operation in the 
field has largely been successful. The question that has to be answered now is 
what the organizations will make of  their existing relations and whether they 
want to expand and structure them.
Deepening Co-operation
Dealing with conflicts nowadays involves a wide range of  issues, which in turn 
requires a wide range of  actors: military, civilian, humanitarian and development 
organizations. To work effectively, these institutions have to have a clear un-
derstanding of  each other’s cultures, policies and strengths. Every international 
organization has something different to offer and its particular skills must be 
used to best effect. Pragmatism and open-mindedness are essential conditions for 
developing a culture of  co-operation and greater understanding of  each other’s 
capabilities.
NATO, for example, is still widely perceived as a purely military organization. Yet 
it has many other useful tools at its disposal, such as capacity building, training 
and assistance, and dealing with defence aspects of  security sector reform. More-
over, the Alliance is also a forum for consultation, not only amongst its 26 mem-
ber states, but also within an extensive and growing network of  partner nations. 
These tools could be exploited in conjunction with those of  other international 
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bodies and organizations to deliver a coherent and comprehensive approach to 
today’s security challenges.
Of  course, NATO also has substantial military assets that are in short supply 
elsewhere. These include capabilities for both combat and post-conflict recon-
struction. The availability of  NATO airlift, communications, logistics arrange-
ments, technical skills and high readiness units such as the NRF could be a 
valuable asset for the UN. In the Balkans, for example, NATO has been a crucial 
actor in supporting restructuring, training and equipping of  national armed 
forces. Lack of  this particular expertise is severely hampering the International 
Community in post-conflict peace operations today. In many troubled coun-
tries—DRC, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan—the construction and implementation of  an 
effective and democratic security sector presents one of  the main obstacles to 
successful stabilization and long-term stability. This area has particular potential 
in deeper UN-NATO co-operation in peacekeeping.
UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno underlined 
the significance of  rapidly deployable military assets for peacekeeping during his 
visit to NATO HQ in January 2006. He argued that given the nature of  spoilers 
in post-conflict contexts and the signal a credible force can provide, the speed 
and effectiveness of  such assets was often far more crucial than the actual size of  
the deployment.
Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss
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With the steep rise in demand for UN peace operations, the UN soon realized 
that doing the job alone was impossible given the organization’s lack of  resources. 
Already in 1992, SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested that regional actors could 
ease the burden of  the UN. To enable and facilitate co-operation, he demanded 
a structured approach and conceptual frameworks.12 As a first step, he set up a 
“High Level Panel” consisting of  the UN, regional and other international organi-
zations. It meets on an annual basis to discuss co-operation and better co-ordina-
tion.
Boutros-Ghali’s successor Kofi Annan shared this view. At the UN World Sum-
mit in 2005, he underlined the importance of  developing predictable partnerships 
and formalized arrangements between the UN and international organizations. 
Annan laid particular emphasis on NATO.
In March 200, during a visit of  the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to New 
York, he urged expanded NATO engagement in Afghanistan and stronger sup-
port for UN efforts in Africa. He suggested that the Alliance might be employed 
in a “peace-enforcement” role, as a bridging force before the deployment of  a 
UN operation.
The issue of  NATO supporting new UN peacekeeping operations was also 
discussed during the round table meeting in New York a few weeks later. UN 
officials underlined that whilst there was a need for robust military capabilities to 
deter challenges, there were substantial operational weaknesses which could jeop-
ardize any UN mission, such as lack of  interoperability among the troops, lack of  
common training, and lack of  intelligence. With a view to these shortfalls, they 
expressed interest in NATO’s capabilities.
This demonstrates that the UN has clearly recognized the advantages that NATO 
could bring in the context of  peace operations and conflict management. Mak-
ing use of  Alliance assets, however, requires a more structured relationship which 
goes beyond ad hoc operational engagement. At the moment, the good co-opera-
tion in the field contrasts with a lack of  co-operation at the institutional level. In 
200, a first staff  meeting took place at headquarters level and a few more have 
followed since. However, there is no structured exchange between the organiza-
tions.
12 UN SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, A77/277-S/2111, New York, June 1992.
 Report of  the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportuni-
ties, 28 July 2006 (A/61/20-S/2006/590*).
 Para 9 and 170 of  the 2005 World Summit Outcome.
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To change this, a UN-NATO declaration is currently being developed. It comes 
as an answer to Annan’s frequent call for co-operation and, at the same time, 
demonstrates NATO’s readiness to support UN peace efforts.15 This support is 
clearly in the interest of  all NATO Allies. By responding to security threats where 
they occur, NATO can safeguard peace and security of  its own members. Many 
weak and failing states have disintegrated into safe-havens for terrorists. Hence, 
operations designed to prevent state failure and frustrate terrorist networks—
even on other continents—is in NATO’s strategic interest.
The UN-NATO declaration is supposed to add an institutional element to, and 
serve as a political framework for, the already good co-operation in theatre. The 
aim is to make relations more predictable and provide a platform for intensi-
fied dialogue. This would lead to a greater understanding of  each organization’s 
modus operandi on issues of  common interest. Ideally, it would result in broader 
and more effective co-operation without duplication.
Practically, this could involve regular staff-level meetings and frequent exchanges 
on issues in which both organizations are active and interested. The Secretary 
Generals could meet and NATO could brief  the UNSC. Moreover, a NATO 
civilian representative could be posted at the UN Department for Political Affairs. 
He/she would ensure regular political exchange and ideally improve the speed 
and effectiveness to identify and react to conflict.
Conclusion
Recently, the idea of  “civil-military co-operation” has begun to feature promi-
nently on the agendas of  both NATO and the UN. Behind this is the conviction 
that greater harmonization and co-ordination between international organizations, 
and mutual support of  civil and military efforts, are vital factors to ensure the 
success of  a peace mission. Only this way can the activities of  the international 
community be optimized. Afghanistan serves as a perfect example. Whilst mili-
tary operations are going well, synchronization with stabilization and reconstruc-
tion efforts remain imperative for the overall success of  the mission. This means 
that crises have to be tackled in a holistic fashion, with specific organizations 
addressing the issues that lie in their areas of  expertise.
15 For example, see: Keynote address by NATO Secretary General Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2 May 2005, <http://
www.NATO.int/docu/speech/2005/s05052a.htm>, in which he stressed that NATO’s relations with the UN had 
to go beyond ad hoc co-operation on the ground. He underlined that structured relationships at the institutional level 
were needed as well as strategic co-ordination, not just tactical co-operation. 
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The rationale of  co-operation between the UN and NATO lies in their adapta-
tion to the new security environment. Both organizations have understood that 
today’s challenges can only be addressed and countered together. However, even 
though a partnership seems logical and necessary against this background, the sit-
uation is not quite that simple. Sensitivities and misperceptions still exist between 
the UN and NATO. For example, some nations within the UN perceive NATO 
as a toolbox for US interests and fear that it might seek to be a world policeman, 
even though NATO vehemently denies having that ambition. On the other hand, 
at NATO, voices can be heard that are critical or doubtful towards the UN. This 
considerably slows down the process of  establishing a structured relationship.
The key for the future is thus to remain flexible and pragmatic. Enhanced UN-
NATO co-operation, particularly at the institutional level, would provide a good 
basis for meeting the challenges of  the 21st century more effectively.
John Byrom, Marcel Gerber and Stuart Reigeluth
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The Venezuelan Oil and Gas Hub: A Regional and Global 
Perspective of Energy Supply and Security Policy
Gerardo J. Briceño P.
In a new world order characterized by anxiety over energy supply, rising energy 
prices promote changes in world politics. In the light of  initiatives on global en-
ergy security that have been adopted under Russia’s presidency of  the G8, stable 
oil prices and energy cooperation are at the top of  the foreign agenda. Venezuela 
is positioning itself  as an energy hub for the entire sub-continent, creating inter-
dependencies with many countries in the region and beyond. 
Among Venezuela’s projects for regional integration are pipelines designed to link 
it with Brazil and Argentina. A pipeline going from Colombia across the Pacific 
Ocean, which would facilitate Asian access to Venezuelan petroleum, is also being 
considered. With these plans, Venezuela responds to the current Iranian crisis, 
triggered by Iran’s refusal to end its program of  uranium enrichment. In addi-
tion, and besides campaigning for a temporary seat in the UN Security Council, 
the Venezuelan government has recently signed several arms and energy deals, 
though not with its traditional partner in both areas, the US. Instead, Moscow 
seems to have guaranteed the emerging Caracas–Beijing strategic partnership by 
supplying aircraft, weapons, and technology.
World demand for energy, especially for limited oil and natural gas supplies, is 
increasing as large industrializing nations such as China, India and Brazil expand 
their economies. Therefore, future oil producers will be able to choose their 
buyers. This situation presents a new outlook for global oil governance. Current 
changes in world politics caused by rising energy prices have influenced this new 
reality, which derives from both a regional net of  energy supply within Latin 
America and global partnerships with Asia in security matters. Propelled by vast 
amounts of  energy resources, the Venezuelan government has adopted a policy 
of  using energy as a political commodity in its foreign relations, counterbalancing 
US energy market expectations. This paper focuses on interdependencies result-
ing from energy demand, addressing the latest developments of  the Venezuelan 
oil and gas policy and its impact on the new architecture of  global energy security.
1 After two weeks of  voting and 7 ballots, it was an outsider, Panama, who emerged as the winner of  the seat of  the 
UN Security Council. Panama became the compromise candidate after a stand-off  between Venezuela and its rival, 
Guatemala. Finally, both candidates withdrew in favour of  Panama. See: Simón Romero. ‘Latin Fight for U.N. Security 
Council Seat Ends,’ The New York Times, November 2, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/02/world/
americas/02nations.html?ex=12012600&en=e7dd01652b51671&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.
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1 . Global Energy Security
The end of  the Cold War, the collapse of  the Soviet Union, the rise of  China, the 
terrorist attacks of  September 11th, and the emergence of  the US as the unchal-
lenged leader in world affairs have dramatically altered the dynamics of  regional 
and global security. What is more, scenarios of  possible conflict are today linked 
to potential oil and gas suppliers, such as the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, Nige-
ria, Angola, Algeria, Sudan, northern Siberia, the southern Chinese Sea, Indone-
sia, and Venezuela.2 In light of  initiatives on global energy security that have been 
adopted under Russia’s presidency of  the G8, stable oil prices and energy coop-
eration have reached the top of  the foreign agenda. At the G8 summit in Saint 
Petersburg in July 2006, global energy security principles were stated. Leaders of  
the G8 must commit to:
– open, transparent, efficient and competitive markets for energy production, 
supply, use, transmission and transit services as a key to global energy secu-
rity;
– enhanced dialogue on relevant stakeholders’ perspectives on growing inter-
dependence, security of  supply and demand issues; 
– diversification of  energy supply and demand, energy sources, geographical 
and sectorial markets, transportation routes and means of  transport;
– safeguarding critical energy infrastructure; and 
– addressing the energy challenges for the poorest populations in developing 
countries.
Venezuela is the world’s fifth-largest oil exporter, and its oil reserves are among 
the top ten in the world. Increases in world oil prices over the last few years have 
allowed Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to push the government’s social 
program spending, expand its commercial ties to other countries, and boost his 
own international profile. The New York Times reports that the huge amount of  
unconventional extra-heavy crude oil reserves in the Orinoco Belt region (located 
southeast of  Caracas), estimated around 25 billion barrels, if  added to those 78 
billion barrels of  conventional crude oil, could allow Venezuela to rival the oil 
2 Genaro Arriagada, Petróleo y gas en América Latina – Un análisis político y de relaciones internacionales a partir de 
la política venezolana (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Especial Energía – DT N° 
20/2006), Madrid 2006, p. 1.
 For the official web site of  the G8 presidency of  the Russian Federation in 2006 and its statement concerning global 
energy security, see: <http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/11.html>.
 Cesar J. Alvarez, Venezuela’s Oil-Based Economy (Council of  Foreign Relations), New York, November 27, 2006, 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/>.
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production of  Saudi Arabia, provided this extra-heavy oil could be turned into a 
more marketable product.5
Regional Oil and Gas Cooperation in Latin America
Latin American oil integration remains a geopolitical commodity, aimed at estab-
lishing mechanisms of  cooperation and integration by using the energy resources 
of  the regions of  the Caribbean, Central and South America as the basis for the 
socioeconomic improvement of  the sub-continent. The Venezuelan government 
looks to build a unified South America that could function as an independent 
bloc and counterbalance expectations of  the US energy market. Propelled by its 
energy wealth and the steady rise in oil prices, it has become much more power-
ful and aggressive in expanding its influence in Latin America and the Carib-
bean. In order to achieve its aims, the Venezuelan President has officially taken 
direct control of  growing international reserves and used them to build influence 
abroad.
Nevertheless, this boom has not yet succeeded in uniting the region. Since its ad-
mission into MERCOSUR in July 2006, Venezuela’s participation has depended 
on the changing price of  oil. Venezuela, South America’s third-largest market, is 
positioning itself  as an energy hub, creating interdependencies with many of  the 
region’s countries. Increased oil revenues have allowed the government to provide 
domestic social programs with generous funding, thereby bolstering its image in 
the country as well as the region.
Regional Net in Big Format: PetroAmérica 
Within Latin America, the Venezuelan oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, 
S. A. (PDVSA) has made generous oil deals. According to official sources,6 
PetroAmérica is viewed as an organization capable of  ensuring the coordina-
tion and harmonization of  energy policies, including oil, oil-derivatives, gas and 
electricity as well as the efficient use of  these resources, technological coopera-
tion, training, development of  energy infrastructure, and the employment of  
alternative sources of  energy. PetroAmérica’s initiative of  energy integration is 
characterized by:
5 Juan Forero, For Venezuela—A Treasure in Oil Sludge. As Prices Soar, the Orinoco Belt Becomes an Economic 
Battleground, in: The New York Times, January 6th, 2006, C Section, p. 1.
6 For detailed information see the Energy Integration Portal (Petróleos de Venezuela, S. A.), <http://www.pdvsa.pdv.
com>.
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– redefining existing relations among South American countries on the basis 
of  their resources and potentials;
– taking advantage of  economic, social, and cultural accomplishments to re-
duce differences in the region;
– reducing the negative effects of  energy costs on the countries in the region, 
caused by speculative and geopolitical factors;
– strengthening other regional initiatives like MERCOSUR, CAN, ALBA, etc.
Areas of Cooperation
PetroAmérica and its homologous sub-regional agreements have made progress 
in several fields: direct negotiations among states, declarations and development 
of  joint initiatives by regions, subscription of  integral agreements of  cooperation, 
identification of  areas of  cooperation, bilateral agreements between companies 
and institutes of  the signatory states, and the establishment of  societies under 
agreements of  specific cooperation on several subjects. Three sub-regional initia-
tives of  energy integration make up PetroAmérica: PetroSur, PetroCaribe, and 
PetroAndina. 
1) PetroSur
Signatory countries: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela.
As the greatest provider for MERCOSUR, Venezuela will limit its participation 
mostly to oil investments. This agreement calls for the construction of  a gas 
pipeline that would carry natural gas southwards from the Caribbean Sea across 
the Amazon jungle to Brazil and Argentina. 
2) PetroCaribe
Signatory countries (not exclusive): Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,  
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Venezuela.
The PetroCaribe agreement improves the financial conditions of  latter agree-
ments by proposing a scale of  financial facilities related to the price of  crude oil. 
Besides that, it foresees an expansion of  the payment period to 25 years, limiting 
interest rates to 1% if  oil prices exceed $0 per barrel. 
3) PetroAndina
Signatory countries: proposed to the countries from the Andean community of  
nations (Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela). 
This agreement calls for pipelines designed to link Venezuela and Colombia, as 
well as another oil pipeline across Colombia to the Pacific Ocean, intended to 
facilitate Asian access to Venezuela’s petroleum.
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Asia: A Global Partnership of Energy Supply and Technology Transfer
The emergence of  China as the world’s largest consumer of  raw materials looms 
as a new major issue in global geopolitics. This development has occurred so 
quickly that until now governments did not have time to ponder its implications. 
At the same time, significant alliances are currently in the making. Venezuela is 
building a very promising strategic alliance with China. This global integration 
provides an open door to Asia, where Russia also plays a decisive role. Within 
this partnership, both countries need each other. China, currently the world’s 
second largest oil consumer, craves oil. To maintain its prodigious growth, China 
needs to increase its energy supply by around  million barrels p/d by 2010, 
nearly twice of  what it currently imports.9 Energy anxiety has forced China to 
diversify its sources of  oil supply.  Because of  new price trends, Asia has emerged 
as a major player within the world economy and on the global energy scene.10 As 
part of  this dynamic process, China could receive some of  the oil that Venezuela 
currently supplies to the US, as the Venezuelan president stated during his last 
7 David Hale, China’s Growing Appetites, in: The National Interest, summer 200, p. 17.
8 Günther Maihold, China and Latin America, in: Gudrun Wacker (ed.), China’s Rise: The Return of  Geopolitics? (SWP 
Research Paper, RP 1), Berlin, February 2006, <http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_
id=170>, pp. 7-5.
9 Gabe Collins and Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, Beijing’s Bolivarian Venture, in: The National Interest, January 9, 2006, 
<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=11912>.
10 Paul Isbell, Fire-breathing dragons: Asia and the challenge of  energy security (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Inter-
nacionales y Estratégicos, WP N° 17), Madrid 2006.
Discussions continue well into the coffee breaks
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visit to China in summer 2006. This reorientation of  oil flow from Venezuela to 
China requires a new infrastructure. 
According to Chávez, China will receive a large share of  Venezuelan oil exports 
not only by decreasing deliveries of  Venezuelan oil to the US, but also by increas-
ing the overall output of  oil. The amount of  oil supplied to China by Venezuela 
will thus increase almost sevenfold, meaning that Venezuela will supply around 
20% of  China’s actual oil needs, thereby overtaking Angola, which currently pro-
duces 18% of  all oil China consumes.
China’s increased association with Venezuela also coincides with a new evaluation 
of  the Iranian crisis after Iran’s refusal to halt its uranium enrichment program. 
This alliance could allow China to withstand a possible loss of  Iranian oil, in case 
the international community imposes further sanctions on Teheran for continu-
ing its nuclear program.
Shipping Routes: Panama, Nicaragua and Tankers in Big Scale
Since forming its partnership with Venezuela, even a war in the Persian Gulf  
does not threaten Beijing. Venezuelan oil is completely profitable and can, in case 
of  war, substitute the Iranian oil supply. Nowadays, oil can be delivered from 
Venezuela to China only by ship, and the closest shipping channel is through the 
Panama Canal, which is too narrow for large tankers. Under current conditions, 
Venezuelan oil is shipped to China by sea across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, 
which takes around 5 days and significantly affects the final price.
Beijing has of  late succeeded in solving this problem. The Hong Kong firm 
Hutchison Whampoa recently won the bid for the management of  the canal’s 
ports contract. According to Chinese officials, the owner, Hong Kong business-
man Li Ka-Shing, is loyal to Beijing. As result of  the planned expansion, the 
canal will in the future be navigable by tankers with displacements of  more than 
00,000 tons. It is expected that after the expansion,12 oil tankers from Venezuela 
could reach Chinese shores in 2 days, which is approximately the same amount 
of  time currently needed for oil deliveries from Angola to China.
 See Panama approves canal expansion, in: BBC news, July 15, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/518272.
stm>.
12 The referendum took place in October and was finally backed by the Panamanians. Voters have overwhelmingly ap-
proved the expansion project. See Panamanians back canal expansion, in: BBC news, October 2, 2006, <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/607106.stm>.
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As a rival in Central America, Nicaragua has announced plans to build a waterway 
linking the Pacific and Atlantic, which would carry bigger ships than the existing 
Panama Canal. If  built, the Inter-Oceanic Nicaragua Canal will be a real alterna-
tive to the existing conditions in Panama. It would also carry super-ships of  up 
to 250,000 tons, which are significantly bigger than the vessels that currently pass 
through Panama.
Hugo Chávez and Hu Jintao also ratified a deal in May 2006, in which Venezuela 
agreed to purchase 18 Chinese oil tankers for $1. billion. In 2007, Venezuela 
plans to buy 2 tankers, thus tripling the size of  its oil fleet and ending its depen-
dence on ships rented from the US. As a result of  this contract, Venezuela will 
own one of  the largest tanker fleets in the world.
The Role of Moscow: Guarantees for the Caracas-Beijing Tandem
Having created its energy security net, Beijing must now maintain it. Perhaps out 
of  fear of  spoiling its relations with Washington, China has not signed any weap-
ons contracts with Venezuela. However, Moscow supports the China-Venezuela 
geopolitical tandem by supplying the Venezuelan government with Russian weap-
ons, technology, and know-how. This unexpected aid from Moscow has taken 
the form of  recent contracts to deliver 100,000 AK-7 Kalashnikovs, 5 military 
helicopters, and 2 Sukhoi SU-0MK2 planes, which will form the backbone of  
the Venezuelan security forces. In addition, two other contracts were signed: one 
for the construction of  a factory in Venezuela to produce AK-10 automatic 
weapons under license, and another venture for manufacturing 7.62 mm calibre 
cartridges. The total cost of  these contracts to modernize Venezuela’s military 
comes to around $ billion. In addition, Russia’s energy giant GAZPROM is also 
thinking of  participating in the construction of  a $15 billion gas pipeline linking 
Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina by 2011.
Relations between the US and Venezuela: Ideologically Divorced but  
Economically Married
Despite negative commentary, such as Chávez’s statement at the 61st UN Gener-
al Assembly in September 2006, Venezuela is still one of  the top four suppliers 
of  crude oil and fuel to the US. The United States absorbs about two-thirds of  
Venezuela’s exports, around two million barrels a day. Even though the develop-
 See Nicaragua plans rival canal route, in: BBC news, October , 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/ 
50588.stm>.
 For full video and transcript from the UN, see <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/gastatement20.shtml>.
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ment of  emerging Asian markets could reduce the ties between Venezuela and 
the US, trade relations remain strong between the two countries.
The US currently obtains between 1% and 15% of  its oil from Venezuela via 
three major US-American enterprises—Chevron Texaco, Exxon, and Conoco 
Philips. All of  them hold investments in Venezuela, mainly in the Orinoco heavy 
oil belt. Nevertheless, Venezuela began selling oil to China in December 200 
and has also invited mainly state-owned companies from Russia, Iran, China and 
India to invest in its oil sector.
US-American society depends on oil and natural gas, which in turn makes reli-
able energy supply a national security issue. Energy analysis from the US Senate15 
addresses the following dangers (among others) concerning their energy supply, 
which in turn might apply to the Venezuelan oil industry: an abrupt disruption of  
supply, the finite nature of  energy resources, and the use of  energy as a geopoliti-
cal weapon.
Supply disruption
As one of  OPEC’s founding members, Venezuela follows decisions taken by the 
cartel. The members coordinate their production quotas and agree to raise oil 
prices by keeping supplies low. The Venezuelan oil strike of  2002 dramatically 
affected supplies, driving up the price of  oil. From December 2nd, 2002 to Feb-
ruary 2nd, 200, PDVSA went on strike to protest against the policies of  Presi-
dent Hugo Chávez. Production fell from around 2.9 m b/d to 1.5 m b/d and 
all exports stopped. As a result of  the strike, the oil sector virtually shut down. 
According to a recent report published by the US Government Accountability 
Office (GAO),16 even though Venezuelan oil production has fallen since 2001, 
exports of  crude oil and petroleum products to the US have remained relatively 
stable with the exception of  the strike period.
Finite Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas
Emerging and growing economies in both the East and the West continue to 
drive up prices and energy requirements in the short term. Since one can only 
measure the resources of  energy on a national scale, it is not clear how long it 
15 For speeches and documents from Senator Dick Lugar (R)—Lugar Energy Initiative—see: <http://lugar.senate.gov/
energy/security/index.html>. For Senator Barack Obama’s (D) speech on February 28, 2006, see:  <http://obama.
senate.gov/speech/060228-energy_security/index.php>.
16 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Energy Security, Issues Related to Potential Reductions 
in Venezuelan Oil Production, June 2006. To view the full GAO report, including the scope and methodology, see 
<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-668>.
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could be before the world faces the prospect that energy supplies may not be 
abundant and accessible enough to support continued growth around the globe.
Use of Energy as a Geopolitical Weapon
Economies worldwide rely so heavily on oil and natural gas that energy-rich na-
tions can intimidate or blackmail other nations by threatening to cut off  supplies. 
Thus, oil exporters who disagree with the US sometimes threaten with the restric-
tion or redirection of  energy supplies. For example, Venezuela’s oil minister and 
president of  PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez, warned that eventual military aggression 
from the US against Venezuela would result in a redirection of  Venezuelan oil to 
other markets, namely China.
Despite pre-existing energy policy in the foreign agenda of  consumer countries, 
heightened competition between consumers to obtain energy from producer 
nations will further increase geopolitical tensions in the future, raising the risk of  
military conflicts for control of  resources.
Global Oil Governance – Strategies for Energy Security
Energy and security represent part of  the nucleus of  contemporary international 
strategic debate. The last century saw rapid growth in fossil fuel consumption, 
and a corresponding expansion in exploration and discovery of  new energy 
sources and resources.  Energy consumption continues to rise in all regions of  
the world, with the highest growth rates now registered in Asia. China’s quest for 
energy and energy security is now a fundamental feature of  its international di-
plomacy in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Russia, altering the global 
energy security equation. 
The inherent instability in regions that provide most of  the world’s oil and gas 
constitutes a grave concern. Instable governments like Venezuela contribute 
to sudden supply reductions, using oil and gas as political weapons with severe 
global consequences. Both China and India are more than ready to take advan-
tage of  it, and have consequently been invited to participate in the Venezuelan 
oil industry. Pipeline networks are also diplomatic tools through which exporting 
countries as well as transshipment countries can exercise political, diplomatic and 
economic leverage. 
The political and security risks in Venezuela’s energy investment environment are 
largely associated with legislation that centralizes power around President Hugo 
Chávez. The management of  Venezuelan oil company PDVSA has become 
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increasingly politicized, with money for maintenance and development being di-
verted to pay for a surge in public spending. Nevertheless, the country has suffi-
cient resources to maintain its high level of  production. Politics and ideology are 
driving the confrontation, as President Chávez seeks to limit American influence 
around the world, starting in Venezuela’s oil fields. The Venezuelan President 
recently decreed that Venezuela would take control of  heavy oil fields in the Ori-
noco Belt, a region southeast of  Caracas of  so much potential that some experts 
say it could give the country more reserves than Saudi Arabia. The United States 
Geological Survey describes the area as the “largest single hydrocarbon accumula-
tion in the world,” making it highly coveted despite Mr. Chávez’s erratic policies.
A decent energy security policy should stay loyal to market principles and not 
treat energy as personal revenue for governments. The most important objective 
of  an energy security policy is to create stable conditions under which the mar-
ket will determine the appropriate use of  the resources. Market integration via 
interdependency might be the most important element of  such an energy security 
strategy.
 Simón Romero & Clifford Krauss, High Stakes: Chávez Plays the Oil Card, in: The New York Times, April 10, 2007, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/0/10/business/worldbusiness/10showdown.html?ei=5087&em=&en=aad2996fa
ca8b0f&ex=11765000&pagewanted=all>.
Mehmet Tezcan elaborating on Turkey’s foreign energy policy
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The ENP and the EMP: Exploring a Division of Tasks 
 between Overlapping Initiatives
Eduard Soler i Lecha
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Pro-
cess, has received extensive criticism. In spite of  the enormous expectations that 
it created in 1995 and the ambitious goals inscribed in the Barcelona Declara-
tion, the results are not satisfactory. The Barcelona declaration specified that the 
Partnership should transform “the Mediterranean basin into an area of  dialogue, 
exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity which 
require a strengthening of  democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable 
and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty 
and promotion of  greater understanding between cultures.” Despite these goals, 
the EMP has made minimal progress and its accomplishments have not acquired 
adequate visibility.
As for the goal of  transforming the Mediterranean into a secure and stable area, 
one should note that major regional conflicts such as in the Western Sahara as 
well as in the Middle East remain unresolved. There has not been a significant 
improvement of  neither democratic nor human rights standards on the Southern 
Shore.2 As for the economic dimension, in spite of  the fact that most southern 
countries have signed association agreements, which would allow for the creation 
of  a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area in the future, south-south integration 
remains weak, and such advances have not led to the extension of  prosperity in 
the region. On the contrary, the World Bank reports that regional imbalances 
have increased. For instance, in 1995 Spain’s GNP per capita was eleven times 
higher than that of  Morocco, in 2002 it was thirteen times higher. Simultaneously, 
European investors have not yet sought to invest in the economies of  these 
countries. The cultural and social dimensions of  the Barcelona process, which 
encompass a great variety of  areas including the promotion of  civil society and 
people-to-people dialogue, have been considered the “Cinderella” of  the EMP: a 
basket full of  rhetoric but empty of  content.
1  Barcelona Declaration, Barcelona, 28 November 1995, <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm>.
2  EuroMeSCo’s 2005 report, entitled “Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of  Democratic 
States,” <http://www.euromesco.net/media/barcelonaplus_en_fin.pdf> is a useful tool to understand the develop-
ments and deficits of  the political basket during the last decade.
  In total, investments towards MPCs represent only 1 per cent of  European foreign investment.
  As for the cultural dimension see Paul Balta, La culture: le parent pauvre, in: Euroméditerranée, un projet à réinventer, 
in: Confluences, Fall 2000, pp. 69-80. In recent years there have been some advances in the cultural dimension, such as 
the creation of  the Anna Lindh Foundation and some projects in the education field. Nevertheless, there has been no 
relevant progress on aspects such as human migration. 
Eduard Soler i Lecha
Panel III – Re-Inventing the 
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The EMP is at risk. As this paper will demonstrate, different initiatives and 
particularly the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could marginalize this 
eleven-year-old project, which, at least rhetorically, offered a cooperation frame-
work and equal footing between the EU and Mediterranean countries. This paper 
will give a brief  overview of  different cooperation frameworks that can compete 
with the EMP. It will concentrate on the functioning and aims of  the ENP, and 
propose a division of  tasks between the ENP and the EMP. A division of  labor 
could mutually reinforce both policies and could be beneficial for citizens on 
both shores of  the Mediterranean Sea.
Alternatives to the Barcelona Process
In 2005, Barcelona hosted an extraordinary Euro-Mediterranean summit. For 
the first time, benefiting from the tenth anniversary of  the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP), the Heads of  State and Government from 5 European and 
Mediterranean countries convened in the Catalan capital in order to revamp a 
stagnant framework. This revitalization was particularly urgent due to the exis-
tence of  other regional and sub-regional initiatives, which risked substituting or at 
least eroding the centrality of  the EMP. Some of  them existed before the launch-
ing of  the EMP, i. e. the 5 + 5 (a Euro-Maghreb cooperation framework) or the 
Mediterranean Forum.5 Some are led by non-Mediterranean actors, such as the 
Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA). Two other initiatives 
are genuinely European and could potentially substitute the EMP: the Strate-
gic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.
The Spanish Minister of  Foreign Affairs, speaking in the Spanish Parliament 
about the preparation of  the 2005 Euro-Mediterranean summit, perfectly illus-
trated the fear of  EMP substitution or marginalization. Miguel Ángel Moratinos 
explained that the summit would take place at a very critical moment for the 
future of  Euro-Mediterranean relations, since the EU was simultaneously dis-
cussing the ENP and the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East. According to his speech, Spain wishes to prevent the ENP from 
becoming a hidden pre-accession strategy for Eastern Europe, and to ensure that 
5  The 5+5 was supported mainly by France in the late eighties and includes Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Malta, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. In recent years, it has reinforced the justice and home affairs and 
the defense dimensions. The Mediterranean Forum has a slightly larger membership. It is a French-Egyptian initiative, 
which functions as an informal mechanism to exchange ideas among Mediterranean countries before the Euro-Medi-
terranean meetings.
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the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East does not 
draw the EU’s attention away from the Barcelona Process.6
In spite of  these fears, the Strategic Partnership is no longer a real threat to the 
survival of  the EMP. It can be considered a project responding to the US-led 
BMENA. Under the Irish EU presidency in 200, the UK stressed this initiative. 
With the Strategic Partnership, the EU proposed a single framework for coop-
eration with the members of  the Barcelona Process, as well as for the rest of  
the Arab world and Iran. Nevertheless, this initiative was considerably diluted by 
member states (mainly Spain), which feared EMP substitution. Consequently, the 
Strategic Partnership became little more than a document without an institutional 
mechanism or funds.
In contrast, the ENP still presents a real threat (but simultaneously an opportu-
nity) for the survival of  the EMP. The ENP was originally designed for eastern 
European countries that were to become EU neighbors after the 200 and 2007 
enlargements (Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Belarus). Subsequently, the mem-
bers of  the Barcelona Process, with the exception of  Turkey (considered an EU 
6  See Comparecencia del señor Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (Moratinos Cuyaubé), para informar 
sobre las líneas generales de la política de su departamento, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (asuntos 
exteriores), VII legislatura, n. 2, 19 May 2005, p. 7. 
7  These impressions were confirmed through several interviews in Brussels in July 2005 with diplomats in charge of  the 
Mediterranean dossier in several EU Member States’ Permanent Representations and in some delegations of  the EU 
Mediterranean countries.
Eduard Soler and Kathrin Brockmann during the debate on enlargement alternatives
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candidate), Libya and the three South Caucasus republics were also integrated 
into the same strategy. 
The rationale behind the ENP is rooted in enlargement policy. EU member states 
have confirmed that enlargement policy is the most effective tool to gain real 
influence in third countries. However, the EU is not willing to extend the mem-
bership perspective further. Consequently, the EU needs to offer an alternative 
for those countries in Eastern Europe, which would like to become members but 
are not offered that option by the EU. Correspondingly, the southern and east-
ern Mediterranean countries, as well as most of  the EU Mediterranean members, 
have recognized (and still recognize) that the EU has been overly focused on 
eastern integration at the expense of  southern cooperation. They therefore advo-
cated enlarging the geographic scope of  this new policy to include the eastern as 
well as the southern EU neighbors.
The EU has tried to replicate the enlargement method (gradualist, result-oriented 
and focused on the negotiation of  the acquis) for those who are not to become 
EU candidates. However, if  the EU is not able to offer the same incentives, it 
cannot expect the same commitments from its neighbors. This characterizes the 
nature of  the ENP and its goals. The ENP is a bilateral policy which gives a “à 
la carte” model for cooperation with third countries. The EU promises concrete 
progress towards further integration of  the third country into the EU internal 
market and offers it further areas of  cooperation in several fields. In exchange, 
the EU asks for definite and demonstrable commitments to political, legal, eco-
nomic and technical reform.
This policy consists of: (a) a General Strategy, based on the guiding principles 
of  the ENP; (b) Country Reports, issued by the European Commission, which 
scrutinize the situation of  the neighboring country in multiple areas; (c) Action 
Plans, also proposed by the European Commission, but negotiated with the third 
country and specifying in which areas the third country should pursue further 
reform, as well as what the EU can offer to accompany these reforms and what 
it can offer as “award” when these reforms are satisfactorily fulfilled; and (d) the 
European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, which merges the two 
programs TACIS and MEDA into a single fund.
The mere existence of  this single fund illustrates to what extent the supporters 
of  the EMP have reasonable fear concerning the dilution of  the EMP into the 
8  Regarding the links of  the ENP and the enlargement method and experience see: Judith Keeley, New Wine in Old 
Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy, in: Journal of  Common 
Market Studies, No. 1/2005, pp. 29-55.
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ENP. Some would evidently like the ENP to disappear and for Europe to revert 
to the pre-200 situation. But the ENP is permanent. The best way not to bury 
the EMP’s future is to find an appropriate division of  tasks between the two ini-
tiatives. This requires exploring areas in which the EMP can provide an advantage 
and in which fields both projects can be mutually and reciprocally reinforcing.
Proposing a Division of Tasks
Before proposing a division of  tasks, one should delineate five different scenarios 
within a five to ten year framework. The first consists of  the complete substitu-
tion of  the EMP with the ENP. The second is to maintain both initiatives, while 
marginalizing the EMP, like the Western European Union in terms of  security. 
The third is to maintain both with an effective division of  tasks. In the fourth 
scenario, both initiatives remain active but pursue contradictory goals and ham-
per each other’s respective progress. The fifth consists of  the failure of  the ENP 
to offer concrete incentives or deliver substantial results. The last scenario may 
imply maintaining the old EMP as the only functioning framework for regional 
cooperation. Neither the first two options, nor the last two, are satisfactory for 
the interests of  the EU or the Mediterranean, as they would damage the EU’s 
credibility. This paper will therefore elaborate on the remaining scenario, which 
calls for a fruitful division of  tasks between the ENP and the EMP.
Robert Khorolskyy and Quijun Zhou discuss their perspectives on energy policy
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Tobias Schumacher foresaw that the ENP would concentrate on bilateral is-
sues and on very specific topics, while the EMP would focus on multilateral and 
institutional dimensions.9 In five to ten years time, the ENP could concentrate on 
the purely bilateral dimension, with very specific goals, which could be framed in 
a larger Euro-Mediterranean forum. To give an example, the Action Plans, which 
could be adopted in the following years, should take into account the guidelines 
fixed in the Euro-Mediterranean five-year working plan, which was adopted at the 
2005 Barcelona summit.
Besides fulfilling this guiding role, other elements would justify maintaining the 
EMP. The Barcelona Process is recognized as being the only forum to bring 
Israel and its Arab neighbors to the same table, not only at a ministerial level but 
also among lower ranking officials. In contrast, the ENP is a vertical European 
policy, devoid of  the regional perspective or south-south dialogue. Thus, these 
south-south contacts are the greatest assets of  the EMP.
Political willingness is the only way to reinforce the utility and the visibility of  this 
dimension of  the EMP. Many differences prevail among its 5 members. Besides 
the classical north-south divide, several north-north and south-south divisions 
exist. In order to reduce the harmful effects of  these divisions, ad hoc or stable 
north-south, north-north and south-south alliances need to be established. Simul-
taneously, stronger institutions need to be built.10
The institutional structure and the functioning of  the EMP have received ex-
tensive criticism, primarily due to their Eurocentric character. In recent years, 
however, there have been some steps to rectify this aspect of  the EMP, such as 
the launching of  the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly or the Anna 
Lindh Foundation. There have been proposals to establish a system of  Co-presi-
dencies (north-south), a Permanent Secretariat, and a Mr./Ms. Mediterranean or a 
Euro-Mediterranean Bank, though these have not made any headway. Neverthe-
less, these institutions could potentially reinforce the feeling of  ownership in the 
Barcelona Process, provide more visibility for its achievements, and, more impor-
tantly, consolidate the institutional dimension that the ENP lacks, thus giving the 
EMP a concrete purpose. 
9  Tobias Schumacher, Riding the Winds of  Change: the Future of  the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in: The Interna-
tional Spectator, No. 2/200, pp. 89–102 (p. 91).
10  For further details see: Eduard Soler i Lecha, Barcelona + 10: Cleavages and Alliances, in: CFSP Forum, No. 2, March 
2006, <http://www.fornet.info/documents/CFSP%20Forum%20vol%20%20no%202.pdf>.
  As for the institutional dimension of  the EMP see: Dorothée Schmid, Les institutions européennes dans le fonc-
tionnement du PEM : de la répartition des compétences à la gestion dynamique du quotidien (EuroMesco Paper 6), 
October 200, <http://www.euromesco.net/media/euromescopaper6_schmid.pdf>.
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Taking these factors into account, a useful division of  tasks could be as follows. 
Due to its gradualist, bilateral, flexible, and results-oriented nature, the ENP is 
likely to obtain a greater level of  success by concentrating on most of  the policy 
issues. In contrast, the EMP could focus on politics through stronger institutions 
and both regular ministerial and under-ministerial contacts, as well as on some 
policies requiring south-south cooperation. This would include several aspects 
of  transport, energy, environment and, to some extent, education, migration and 
cooperation in justice and home affairs.
As for the reinforcement of  the political dimension, three factors are necessary. 
The first involves the positive evolution at the international level towards resolv-
ing the Arab-Israeli conflict. Experience shows that the greatest advances in 
Euro-Mediterranean relations occurred when there was some optimism regard-
ing the solution of  this conflict. During the worst phases of  the conflict, the 
EMP suffered from the atmosphere created by the Arab-Israeli hostilities. This 
hampered progress in fields such as security negotiations (e.g. the approval of  a 
Charter for Peace and Stability in 2000) and polluted the discussions. The second 
factor is stronger leadership and increased political willingness. EMP progress 
cannot rely solely upon the willingness of  southern European countries. Both the 
Mediterranean partners and the non-Mediterranean EU members have to show 
a stronger commitment to the EMP and to solving the different challenges of  
that region in general. Undoubtedly, Italy, France and Spain will continue to lead 
the project. This leadership needs reinforcement, although it is crucial to prevent 
competition between these three countries. There is also the possibility for the 
other 2 members of  the EMP to assume leadership in various fields. The third 
and final factor would be ambitious institutional reform. As mentioned, the cur-
rent initiatives of  the Barcelona Process require increased public visibility, as do 
the existing EMP institutions such as the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Euro-
Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. Creating new institutions would also help 
reach the threefold objective of  increased visibility, ownership, and effectiveness. 
The creation of  a Permanent Secretariat might be a way to achieve these goals.
In parallel, the EU will need to assure the success of  the bilateral policy dimen-
sion of  the ENP and of  the few policies that are designed and implemented 
regionally. If  the EU wants to remain a credible and central partner for the south-
ern and eastern Mediterranean countries, it cannot afford another failure. Per-
ceived as such, the EU may need to revise to what extent the incentives offered 
by the ENP appeal to its new and old neighbors, and whether it will be able to 
deliver what it has promised. In contrast to the EMP, it is still too early to evalu-
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ate the outcomes and shortcomings of  the ENP. Nevertheless, there is a serious 
risk that the ENP might fall short of  its expectations. 
Conclusion
There is room for the mutual coexistence and reciprocal reinforcement of  the 
ENP and the EMP. Some still fear a “Mediterraneist school,” which does not 
appreciate the purely bilateral level of  the ENP and which anxiously foresees the 
swallowing of  the EMP by the ENP. However, a careful analysis of  the strengths 
and the weaknesses of  both initiatives may lead to a stable and fruitful division of  
tasks between the Barcelona Process and the Neighborhood Policy. The Barcelo-
na Process would concentrate on policies and regional integration (mainly south-
south), the politics of  Euro-Mediterranean relations, and the institutional dimen-
sion. The ENP would provide the framework for increasing the effectiveness of  
most policies currently included in the Barcelona Process and would manage the 
overwhelming majority of  the funds. A clear and shared strategy, stronger leader-
ship, an enlarged and more diversified political willingness, and concrete and reli-
able incentives will ensure visible success for both the EMP and the ENP.
John Byrom presents an inside view on US counter-insurgency strategies
The Shanghai  
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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:  
A New Security Provider for Central Asia?
Natalia Touzovskaia
The war on terror re-opened a Pandora’s box of  security challenges in Central 
Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a six-nation group that 
includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has 
rapidly been gaining influence in the changing context of  regional security. Today 
India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia have obtained observer status. After celebrat-
ing its fifth anniversary in Shanghai in June 2006, the SCO found itself  facing 
even more questions than at the time of  its creation in 2001. To some extent 
this is due to the participation of  Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad 
at the summit who talked of  Iran’s intention to join the organization. Hosting 
controversial visitors is only a part of  a complex future that the SCO faces at the 
moment. The institution is still in search of  its own identity. While its agenda has 
widened and now embraces discussions of  economic and energy security coop-
eration, in practice its members have narrowed their joint activity to anti-terrorist 
exercises and most of  these efforts are still implemented on a bilateral basis.
The following questions arise in this context: to what extent can this organization 
become an efficient security provider despite the differences among its members? 
How could it help solve regional security problems? How could the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization fit into the overall picture of  the region and interact with 
other security actors? This paper will look at the evolution of  the organization 
and its latest developments, analyze limitations of  its capabilities, and examine its 
prospects as a security provider in the region.
In Search of Identity: “A New Model of Successful International Cooperation” or  
“Oriental NATO”?
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established on June 15th, 2001. 
China, Russia and the four Central Asian republics, excluding Turkmenistan 
(which has a neutral status), signed the Shanghai Declaration, formally setting up 
a new framework for future cooperation. In practice, however, this document 
grew out of  agreements on measures of  mutual trust and on joint reduction of  
armed forces between three Central Asian countries, Russia, and China. These 
initial agreements were signed during a series of  meetings of  the so-called Shang-
Natalia Touzovskaia
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hai Five Forum in the 1990s. At that time, Uzbekistan did not participate in the 
Shanghai Five Forum because of  its strong anti-Russian stance.
The Forum was created in order to tackle traditional security challenges in the 
region, which some analysts in Russia call “the Soviet heritage.”2 The disintegra-
tion of  the Soviet Union left Russia and the Central Asian republics with un-
settled disputes over one of  the longest borders in the world, the border with 
China. This was successfully resolved after Russia and China initiated a settlement 
process. Moscow and Beijing have signed a series of  agreements since 1990 and 
a bilateral treaty in 2001 that reiterated the absence of  territorial claims. Bilat-
eral agreements between Beijing and the Central Asian states were concluded in 
199–2000.
It soon became clear that the border issue was not the only problem requir-
ing collective action. New challenges and threats, primarily terrorist and radical 
Islamist activities, illegal drug and arms trafficking, human trafficking, illegal 
migration and shortage of  water supplies have caused Russia and China to unite 
their efforts. The rise of  the Taliban in 1996 in neighboring Afghanistan also 
helped boost this cooperation. To a certain extent the Central Asian republics, 
China, and Russia were pioneers facing a whole set of  modern challenges long 
before they entered the security agenda of  the West. Their deliberate attempt 
to unite their efforts shows the limits of  unilateral action when trying to handle 
new threats. Even Uzbekistan, which does not share a border with China, posi-
tioned itself  as an independent player in the region and decided to take part in 
the SCO. This caught the attention of  many analysts at the time. The creation of  
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization appeared as an achievement in enhanced 
regional cooperation.
Within five years the SCO has formally developed a wide range of  tools to 
improve its performance, especially on an institutional level. The initial struc-
tures adopted are as follows: the Council (heads of  states), the Council (heads 
of  governments), Foreign Ministers Council, Meetings of  Ministers, Council of  
1 The term “Shanghai Five” was introduced in 1996 at the summit in Shanghai between five heads of  states, although 
meetings of  these five powers have been taking place since the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991.
2 A. Lukin, A. Mochulskij, Shankhaiskaya Organizacia Sotrudnichestva: strukturnoe oformlenie i perspektivy razvitia, in: 
Analiticheskie Zapiski (MGIMO MFA RF), February 2005, No. 2, p. .
 The Shanghai Five states had already officially condemned religious extremism and international terrorism in the 
Almaty declaration signed in July 1998. A year later they agreed to adopt a set of  common measures to tackle these 
challenges.
 I. Facon, Les enjeux de sécurité en Asie Centrale: la politique de la Russie, in: Annuaire Français des Relations Interna-
tionales (AFRI), 200, p. 658, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_80/etudes-recherches_119/annu 
aire-francais-relations-internationales_12/afri-200_20.html>.
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National Coordinators, and the Secretariat (based in Beijing).5 The first Secretary 
nominated was the former Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Deguang. The 
Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) was first introduced in Tashkent in 200, 
which some analysts see as a key SCO tool to promote regional security.6 During 
the last two years this institutional structure expanded and shifted its emphasis 
from antiterrorist tools to economic cooperation and energy security. The SCO 
Business Forum took place in September 2006 in Kazakhstan and experts are 
currently discussing an initiative to create the SCO Energy Club.
The organization of  the core SCO document provides an elaborate conceptual 
basis for SCO performance. This “Charter,” signed on July 7th, 2002 in St. Pe-
tersburg, states a broad range of  principles shared among all members: equality 
of  all participants, respect of  sovereignty and territorial integrity of  the member 
states, non-interference in their internal affairs, peaceful settlement of  disputes, 
openness to the participation of  others, and the agreement not to target third 
states or any international organizations. It is these principles that make the SCO 
particularly attractive to its participants. If  Russia and China had declared these 
principles to be essential elements of  their foreign policy early on and had kept 
emphasizing their importance during the 1990s, the Central Asian states would 
have been more likely to adhere to them because these principles would not 
threaten their newly-acquired sovereignty after the disintegration of  the Soviet 
Union. In practice, non-interference in internal affairs brings benefits not as 
much to states, but to their regimes. It offers them stability and maintains their 
status quo in the region, yet another advantage that the SCO can bring to political 
elites in troubled Central Asia. Moreover, the stated equality among SCO partici-
pants makes the organization even more attractive to small countries despite the 
participation of  regional giants such as Moscow and Beijing.
Another document sometimes recognized as the SCO’s contribution to interna-
tional law is the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and 
Extremism, signed in July 2001. It gives clear definitions of  all the three notions 
(“three evils” according to Chinese interpretation):
– Terrorism: “an action with intent to cause death of  a civilian … as well as 
planning, aiding and abetting an action for the purpose of  intimidating the 
5 Khartia Shankhaiskoi Organizacii Sotrudnichestva (the SCO Charter), Chapters –11, adopted on June 7th, 2002, in 
St.-Petersburg, <http://president.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2002/06/106755.shtml>.
6 A. Lukin, A. Mochulskij (fn. 2), p. 12. 
7 A. Khasenov, U SCO budet svoi energeticheskii klub, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 25th, 2006, p. 8.
8 A. Lukin, A. Mochulskij, (fn. 2), p. 8. 
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population, disrupting social security and forcing authorities or an interna-
tional organization to commit an action or restrain from it …”
– Separatism: “an action with intent to break a territorial integrity of  a state, 
including  separating a part of  its territory, its violent disintegration, as well 
as planning to aid and abet such an action …”
– Extremism: “an action with purpose of  a violent seizure of  power, violent 
hold of  power and violent change of  constitutional order, as well as social 
security violation, including organizing illegal armed formations and partici-
pating in them.”9
These definitions form a reference point for international law, which member 
state officials praise as “a new model of  successful international cooperation.”10 
Yet from the very beginning the range of  SCO activities remained very broad. 
They included economic issues, energy dialogue and the use of  natural resources, 
emergency relief, transport and communications, scientific, technical and cultural 
cooperation. Such a variety showed that the field for cooperation and the num-
ber of  issues requiring collective efforts was vast, but it also raised the question 
of  SCO identity. It is still unclear today how the SCO can help solve regional 
security problems.
While Russian experts emphasize multilateralism, dialogue, and strong antiter-
rorist tools,12 Western and especially American analysts point out that the SCO is 
gradually developing a confrontational attitude towards the US and often label it 
as “Oriental NATO” or “OPEC with nuclear weapons.” Lately this anti-Ameri-
can stance of  the SCO has gained popularity among Moscow officials as well as 
in the Russian press. Some Russian officials have made quite eloquent remarks 
while avoiding any explicit statement on the issue.15
The US has made progress in the region since the start of  the global war on ter-
ror. The anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan proved to be a strong consolidat-
9 Shankhaiskaia Konvencia o bor’be s terrorizmom, separatizmom i extremizmom, June 15th, 2001, <http://www.
ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf/0/d160d59ec0ac1590256b5600575a?OpenDocument>.
10 V. Putin, SCO – Novaya Model’ Uspeshnogo Mezhdunarodnogo Sotrudnichestva, in: Rossiiskaya Gazeta, June 1th, 
200.
 Khartia Shankhaiskoi Organizacii Sotrudnichestva (the SCO Charter—fn. 5), Chapter .
12 A. Kokoshin, ShOS formiruet “poias druzhby” vdol’ granic Rossii, <http://shanhai.rfn.ru/interviews/doc.
html?id=8>.
 G. Dyer, R. McGregor, Opposition to US inspires “NATO of  the East.” Is Shanghai Cooperation Organization a 
Threat to the West?, in: The Financial Times, June 22nd, 2006.
 Some of  the recent articles in Nezavisimaya Gazeta describe the SCO as “a NATO competitor.” See: A. Blinov, ShOS 
Mozhet Stat’ Konkurentom NATO, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 20th, 2006.
15 For instance, President Vladimir Putin admitted that the creation of  the SCO reflected “the necessity for new centres 
of  power” in the region. See interview in: The Financial Times, September 10th, 2006, and P. Sonders, Na blizkom 
rasstoianii i bez kopania v dushe, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 25th, 2006.
The Shanghai  
Cooperation Organization

 
New Faces Conference 2006
ing factor for the development of  the SCO and boosted the institution’s activity 
as an opposition to American presence. The prevalence of  anti-Americanism, 
however, does not always imply that cooperation with the West has lost ground 
in the region. In reality, the situation is more nuanced. The SCO states (with the 
exception of  China) initially saw US military presence in the region as a strong 
means to tackle the Taliban threat.16 Originally, SCO states considered US pres-
ence to be linked directly to the military campaign in Afghanistan rather than 
a permanent institution. They examined it in quite pragmatic terms as another 
tool to keep the situation under control. It was only after the security situation 
in Afghanistan started to deteriorate, extremist movements had regained ground, 
and drug trafficking had grown substantially, that the criticism of  American pres-
ence in Central Asia became quite open. Moreover, the closure of  the US base 
in Uzbekistan was more a reaction to the US criticism of  the Andijan tragedy 
of  May 2005 and to the subsequent cut of  the financial aid Washington granted 
Tashkent (after the agreement reached on October 7th, 2001 concerning the mili-
tary base), than a substantial policy change. Germany was allowed to keep its base 
in Termez because it took a low-key approach to the events in Andijan, and is 
now the only NATO country which deploys troops in Uzbekistan. Despite talks 
of  leaving Termez as a sign of  solidarity with the US,19 the German military ac-
knowledges its importance for an anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan.20 At the 
same time the US and Kyrgyz authorities have finally reached a new agreement 
concerning the Manas base, which currently serves as one of  the key NATO 
bases in the region. In the aftermath of  9/11, the US and France used the Kulob 
base in Tajikistan on the basis of  bilateral agreements.21 This base has continued 
to operate as a NATO transit point since 200.
Even before Washington’s active presence in the region, the fight against the 
“three evils” has been at the heart of  the SCO agenda and was initially strongly 
emphasized by the member states suggesting the institution’s identity could have 
developed in that direction. Indeed, all of  the SCO states are facing all three 
challenges. Russia is coping with terrorism, extremism and separatism, including 
fighting Chechen separatists and groups of  religious extremists in the Northern 
16 I. Facon (Fn. ), p. 659.
 I. Zviagelskaya, Central’naya Azia: evolucia parametrov bezopasnosti i stabil’nosti, in: Yuzhnyi Flang SNG. 
Central’naya Azia, Kaspii-Kavkaz: energetika i politika, Moscow 2005, p. 8. See also: I. Facon (Fn. ), p. 66.
 Uzbek allow Germany to keep base, in: BBC News, December 11th, 2005.
19 Uzbekistan: Germany Likely to Leave Uzbek Base, February 1st, 2001, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/
02/70a79f6-810-757-b6a-690670d0c6.html>.
20 Interview with Colonel Yury Morozov, Head of  Research Task Group on Russia-NATO security cooperation in CIS 
space, Institute of  Europe (RAS), Moscow, October 2006.
21 V. Socor, NATO Leader Makes Historic Visit to Central Asia, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 25th, 200, <http://
www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=01&issue_id=118&article_id=26872>.
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Caucasus. China is preoccupied with activities of  the Ouigour separatists in the 
western province of  Xingjian. The Central Asian republics have long been fight-
ing extremists groups and religious organizations, the most influential ones being 
“Hizb ut Tahrir” and the extremist religious movement “Islamic Movement of  
Uzbekistan.” In 2001 this organization renamed itself  to “Islamic Movement of  
Turkistan” (IMT), implying that it aimed at establishing a theocratic Islamic state 
not only in the Fergana valley in Uzbekistan but throughout Central Asia.22 In 
1999–2000 there were a number of  armed uprisings in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz-
stan organized by the Islamic Movement of  Uzbekistan and supported by Tajik 
and Afghan extremists. Currently the IMT is included in the State Department’s 
list of  international terrorist groups.
Regardless of  their interest in combining efforts in the fight against terrorism, 
most of  the SCO activities have been implemented on a bilateral basis. There 
has been only one multilateral anti-terrorist exercise so far, “Interaction—200,” 
which took place in August 200 between Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan. The rest of  the exercises have been accomplished bilaterally: 
China and Kyrgyzstan organized joint exercises in October 2002, joint Chi-
nese-Russian military exercises were held in August 2005, and Chinese-Kazakh 
anti-terrorist exercises took place in August 2006. The Regional Anti-Terrorist 
Structure (RATS) remains more of  a project than a reality. This organization was 
created in 2002 for the purpose of  collecting and analyzing data on terrorists and 
extremist activities, intelligence sharing, and legal cooperation. Although it be-
came operational in June 200, its main activities still remain only on paper. The 
information exchange between SCO states as well as the sharing of  intelligence is 
in a very initial phase. Even Chinese officials, who were rather enthusiastic about 
RATS at the beginning, showed less optimism in their more recent statements.2
“The Big Two” versus “The Small Three”
To some degree, the SCO consists of  two groups of  countries. China and Rus-
sia play a leading role within the organization (implied by the choice of  the SCO 
official languages: Russian and Chinese). On the one hand, the Central Asian 
states have so far accepted this leadership, also backed by Beijing and Mos-
cow downplaying human rights issues and undemocratic trends in the political 
developments of  the region. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan sometimes join their efforts within the SCO as the so-called “Small 
22 See L. Montanaro-Jankovki, Les coopérations sécuritaires face à la criminalité transnationales en Asie Centrale, in: 
Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales (AFRI), 2005, p. 59.
2 The Chinese Vice-Minister of   Public Security Meng Hongwei noted on August 21st, 2006 during one of  its press-
conferences that RATS developments were rather “satisfactory,” <http://www.china.org.cn/russian/255128.html>.
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Three.” Looking at the level of  economic performance of  the SCO members, 
this division is natural: while China, Russia and, to some extent, Kazakhstan have 
relatively strong economies, the three Central Asian economies in comparison 
are extremely weak. Today an average salary in Kyrgyzstan, still high relative to 
neighboring Tajikistan, amounts to 20 USD per month and in some regions to 5 
USD per month.2 
Such a division however serves mostly as a tool to trace the different agendas of  
each group of  countries and examine the disputes that exist within each of  these 
groups. Besides, Kazakhstan does not currently seek a position within one group. 
Due to its strong economic performance (9,5% economic growth in 200) and its 
growing role as an energy supplier in international markets, Astana wishes to be 
recognized as a regional leader,25 gradually leading to competition with Russia and 
other Central Asian republics (Uzbekistan in particular), also claiming regional 
leadership.
A Chinese-Russian Couple: Bones of Contention
Beijing strongly supported the creation of  the SCO because it saw a chance to 
pursue its old security agenda with new means. In fact, the SCO contributed to 
solving three of  China’s major concerns:
– territorial integrity and the fight with Ouigour separatism in Xingjian;
– promoting a model of  a multipolar world and projecting power into Central 
Asia with the long-term objective of  effecting a “Big Nation” renaissance;
– solving the growing need for energy supplies.26
All three have been addressed: political issues have been negotiated within the 
SCO framework and energy security questions have been discussed on a bilateral 
basis, mainly with Kazakhstan and Russia. Beijing signed a number of  deals with 
Astana for long-term investments of  $8 billion and agreed to build a pipeline 
from Kazakhstan to Western China.27 However, power projection in Central Asia 
remains problematic because of  Russian dominance, and Beijing has so far been 
very cautious in this regard. Yet the ambitions remain and are pursued by other 
means. China tends to highlight the necessity of  stronger economic cooperation, 
2 I. Zviagelskaya (fn. 17), p. .
25 See Kazakhstan seeks recognition as regional leader, ISN Security Watch (ETH Zurich), September 26th, 2006, 
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16722>.
26 A. Jafalian, Equilibres Géopolitiques en Asie Centrale: la montée en puissance de la Chine, in: Annuaire Stratégique et 
Militaire, Paris 2005, p. 16.
27  Ibid., p. 10.
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which would put it in a stronger economic position than Moscow. At the same 
time, Beijing never misses the opportunity to act on a bilateral basis in order to 
gain political dividends with smaller states. After the tragic events in Andijan in 
2005, when Moscow did not react immediately, Beijing was the first to welcome 
President Islam Karimov with an official visit.
To some extent Russia’s agenda is similar to that of  China. Moscow is concerned 
with promoting a model of  a multipolar world and spreading its influence in 
Central Asia after a long period of  retreat from the region in the 1990s. Energy 
security has become an issue of  growing importance over the last two years, 
especially after the gas crisis with Ukraine. In fact, it was Moscow who proposed 
the creation of  the SCO Energy Club in 2006.
Though officially relations between Russia and China are currently “at their best 
[level]… in our entire history,”28 the agendas of  these two leading countries create 
inherent competition. Today there are three areas of  emerging differences:
– Agenda priorities: Beijing believes economic issues should be given the same 
priority as the fight against terrorism and should receive even more attention 
in the future. Moscow still underscores the importance of  its security agenda 
and prioritizes only the energy dialogue among economic issues.
– Models of  economic cooperation: according to Moscow, economic integra-
tion is a long-term goal and current cooperation should be enhanced among 
the countries with similar levels of  economic development. In contrast, 
China with its impressive economic potential insists that a common eco-
nomic partnership is necessary in the near future.
– Views on further enlargement: China accuses Russia of  a pro-Indian stance 
and strongly objected to providing New Delhi with the status of  an SCO 
observer.29 There are also disagreements between the two countries on how 
far the SCO should extend its zone of  responsibility.
Unresolved Issues among “The Small Three”
Among the three Central Asian republics there are even more serious discords 
than between the two leaders of  the SCO. The disputes between “The Small 
Three” date back to the time they became Soviet republics, and today are aggra-
vated by more recent ethnic and religious divides in the region.
28 Vladimir Putin in: The Financial Times, September 10th, 2006.
29 S. Luzianin. „ShOS ne speshit raspakhivat’ dveri, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 26th, 2006, p. 76. 
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Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan
The borders still remain undefined between these two countries and the prospect 
of  settlement looks grim. There are 70 to 100 areas of  dispute, depending on dif-
ferent readings of  old Soviet borders.0 The delimitation process has been com-
plicated by two Uzbek enclaves on Kyrgyz territory (Sokh and Shakhimardan) 
and one Kyrgyz enclave in Uzbekistan (Barak).
Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
The border between these countries is also not delimited. There are about 70 
contentious areas and a Tajik enclave (Vorukh) in Kyrgyz territory that was 
already the centre of  Kyrgyzo-Tajik ethnic tensions in Soviet times. Moreover, 
the situation is currently deteriorating due to growing activity of  radical Islamist 
groups. The armed incursions of  radicals on Kyrgyz territory in 1999/2000 came 
from the territory of  Tajikistan. According to Kyrgyz authorities, this provides 
solid proof  that there are extremist training camps operating on Tajik territory.
Tajikistan-Uzbekistan
Potentially the most disrupting problems for the region lie in Tajiko-Uzbek rela-
tions, complicated by long-standing and unresolved ethnic conflict. A community 
of  one million Uzbek inhabitants plays an active role in Tajik internal political 
life, and there are five million Tajik individuals in Uzbekistan, though they are 
less active in the politics of  the country. The ethnic Tajik population, which 
amounts to one fourth of  the whole population of  Uzbekistan, lives mainly in 
the poorest areas along the Tajiko-Uzbek border and reportedly has links to radi-
cal Islamist groups. During the 1999/2000 uprisings, some Tajiks supported the 
Islamic Movement of  Uzbekistan radicals. As a result, Uzbek authorities are cur-
rently resettling ethnic Tajiks by force. The Uzbeko-Tajik border is systematically 
mined from the Uzbek side, leading to numerous civilian casualties.2
The SCO has not tried to settle these issues, and none of  the problems men-
tioned so far have been discussed within the organization’s framework, though it 
could have had a real impact on the situation given its unique and very successful 
experience settling the border between former Soviet republics and China.
Apart from internal disputes of  the member states, the relations between the 
two groups of  countries have not always been smooth. The most controversial 
issue turned out to be the question of  SCO enlargement. The “Small Three” 
0 Uzbekistan insists the border should be delimited on the basis of  a 192 map, while Bishkek suggests a 195 version. 
See ibid., p. 81. 
 Luzianin (fn. 29)., p. 8.
2 Ibid., p. 85.
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strongly objected to expanding the membership and including India and Pakistan 
because of  the continued conflict in Kashmir. They contend that since many 
existing problems have yet to be solved, the organization should not use its 
scarce resources in other areas. As a result, India, Pakistan and Mongolia were 
only granted observer status in 2005. A contact group with Afghanistan was also 
created, but full Afghan membership was never approved. In 2006, Iran showed 
serious interest in membership and participated in the SCO Shanghai summit, 
thereby also attaining observer status. However, Teheran’s participation created 
great controversy from the beginning, causing vivid debates between member 
states and eliciting a strong international response. In the end, SCO enlargement 
was suspended after discussions at the eve of  the Shanghai summit.
Prospects of SCO development
Several factors demonstrate the serious limitations of  the SCO as a security pro-
vider:  implicit and explicit disputes between member states, their different agen-
das and priorities, the significant role of  external factors, which to some extent 
consolidate institutional development more than internal dynamics, and an inabil-
ity to solve key security problems of  the region even between member states.
It would be presumptuous to expect a five-year-old organization that includes 
more than one third of  the world’s population and operates in one of  the most 
instable regions in the world to become an efficient mechanism of  regional co-
operation. It does, however, have the potential to become an active player since 
the SCO has so far provided an attractive model of  cooperation for both regional 
giants and small regional powers, and draws attention of  other key Asian actors. 
The question remains as to what extent this model serves as a common ground 
for all members or simply allows each of  them to follow their own agendas. In 
order to make the SCO a viable regional institution, its members will have to 
agree on a number of  common issues that have previously caused dispute be-
tween them:
– the zone of  responsibility and future enlargement;
– further forms of  cooperation in already prioritized fields: fight against 
terrorism (in particular enhancing the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure 
activity), extremist groups and drug trafficking, future modes of  economic 
cooperation;
 Luzianin (Fn. 29), p. 7.
 Iranian President to cause a stir at security summit, in: The Financial Times, June 1th, 2006. The US also applied for 
observer status in the SCO but the application was rejected. Among the other countries who expressed interest in the 
SCO are Japan and Belarus. 
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– solving old disputes between member states, in particular the border prob-
lems of  the Central Asian republics;
– interaction with other regional organizations, such as the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) and international players in the region, such as 
NATO.
Questions also arise regarding the prospects of  cooperation with Western players. 
How might Western powers and security institutions plug into this regional game? 
The US and NATO are already operative in the region.  NATO, in particular 
having taken greater responsibility for the military operation in Afghanistan in 
October 2006, simply cannot afford to ignore any possibility of  cooperation with 
regional actors. Currently though, NATO engages in another channel of  dialogue 
with the Central Asian countries through its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program 
that has so far proved to be more efficient than multilateral dialogue. This is 
particularly true in the case of  Kazakhstan which upgraded its relations with the 
Alliance from PfP to the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The Uzbek 
IPAP program, however, has been suspended after the Andijan tragedy. At the 
same time, NATO maintains its dialogue with Russia through the NATO-Russia 
Council and holds a joint program in training specialists to fight against the traf-
ficking of  illegal drugs in Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Russia’s position towards strategic alliances is presented by Natalia Touzovskaia
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However, the Alliance should not downplay the SCO channels since the security 
situation in Afghanistan is currently deteriorating, an issue that will continue to 
dominate the regional agenda. NATO could also be more attractive for Central 
Asian states since it provides a multilateral framework and has a more positive im-
age in the region than the US. Potentially the most fruitful field of  cooperation for 
the Alliance could be the fight against drug trafficking. However, NATO currently 
restrains itself  from this issue. In order to stabilize the region in the long term, 
this issue requires serious attention. Joint training programs with Russia are not 
enough. As Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov pointed out, since the start of  
the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan in autumn 2001, the turnover of  drug 
trafficking in the region has more than doubled and has continued to grow since.5
In the near future it is unlikely that the SCO could enter into any serious compe-
tition with Western institutions, mainly because it still needs to develop itself  as a 
security actor and overcome the differences between its member states. Instead, 
this organization might compete with other regional structures, such as the Col-
lective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Uzbekistan became a member in 
2006 and China is not participating. The CSTO (initially: Russia, Armenia, Be-
larus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) could become a more important tool 
since Russia and China might increase their competition for regional leadership. 
In this context Moscow would play up any structures that exclude Beijing; it 
already uses CSTO to increase its influence in granting preferences in arms sales 
and to provide free training and education for the militaries of  member states.6 
It also tries to refocus NATO’s interaction with CSTO countries, turning from a 
bilateral track to full cooperation between two institutions, as it had suggested in 
200 when it proposed a NATO-CSTO dialogue.
In the long term, the prospect for SCO development looks fragile. So far, the 
institution has been attractive for its members mainly because it allowed them to 
preserve their status quo in Central Asia. With the changes among regional elites 
and the slow but steady modernization of  Central Asian societies, it will certainly 
need to look for a new raison d’être or at least try to turn its existing ambitious 
agenda into reality.
5 See A. Lukin (fn. 2), p. 20.
6 I. Plugatarev., Vozvrashchenie bludnogo Uzbekistana, in: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, September 15th, 2006. 
 Russian Deputy Minister of  Foreign Affairs G. Karasin interview to Interfax on November 8, 2005, <http://www.mid.
ru/ns-rsng.nsf/a81e5eb116962569ee008fdbe/2569d80022166c2570b002fff?OpenDocument>.
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The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Necessity  
for Asian Strategic Stability
Rafeh A. Malik
Inter-state conflicts in Asia have continued to prevent peace in the region. The 
balance of  terror among major actors, such as India and Pakistan, and China 
and her neighbors has prevented a genuine process of  détente within the region, 
thereby hindering arms control and economic cooperation among the Asian 
states. Regional economic organizations like the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of  Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) lag behind the European Union, yet Asian states remain bigger 
investors in the arms industry. They have been developing and purchasing lethal 
weapons, including nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
The Cold War experience has demonstrated the need for a regional institution 
to manage and resolve conflict. The Asian strategic environment lacks such an 
institution. Although the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) appears to be an attrac-
tive candidate for such a role, it lacks credibility. Theoretically speaking, ARF has 
a global orientation, but its performance has been unimpressive regarding nuclear 
non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula, diminishing the traditional animosi-
ties between China and her neighbors, and cementing the peace process between 
India and Pakistan.
Asian security challenges require a new approach to conflict management and res-
olution. A new dynamic has developed in Asia. Emerging centers of  political and 
economic power are forcing states to reassess national interests and prospects. 
Trade opportunities and commercial ambitions foster new bilateral agreements, 
and growing energy demands promote intra-regional dependencies. Strategies for 
addressing issues such as terrorism and drug trafficking require cross-national 
cooperation. Established, inactive regional organizations and recently formed 
ones seem poised to offer more integrated approaches to common concerns. 
Meanwhile, with the advent of  a greater multilateral and international framework, 
Western and especially American influence has receded.
Still, this transformation should not be overstated. The Asian political and eco-
nomic scene has changed. Even while an increasing interdependence among states 
determines the future of  many people from different nations, national sovereign-
ties in Asia still reign supreme and undermine regional structures. Core national 
interests continue to steer foreign policies. Traditional alliances along with historic 
Rafeh A . Malik
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suspicions and rivalries impede new alignments. Deeply entrenched leaders and 
elites delay changes. The United States of  America remains a major player in Asia 
even while its quasi-unilateral international leadership has diminished.
Within this context, ASEAN has gained influence and the ARF seems to be a 
viable forum for conflict resolution. Despite the importance of  sovereignty as a 
founding principle, any upheaval in one member state closely affects the others. 
Since smaller members are more at risk than their bigger counterparts, interde-
pendence remains asymmetrical. The bigger states tend to enjoy a greater deal 
of  influence over their smaller partners. This institutional approach proves the 
viability of  ARF. Simultaneously, the success of  ARF requires active participation 
from Asian nations and other big powers. Will ARF play an important role in 
enhancing Asian security? Is ARF a realistic forum for conflict management and 
resolution?
The Asian Strategic Landscape
The Asian continent has experienced many rapid changes in the past decades, 
including the alignment and non-alignment of  states, alliances, and pacts made 
and ignored by bigger partners. The United States abandoned Pakistan after the 
collapse of  the former Soviet Union. The emerging power of  China has brought 
about a shift in Indian policy and aligned her more closely with the United States.
Many now picture Asia as a breeding ground for global terrorism. For American 
foreign policy, 9/11 was a watershed event originating in Asia. It led to US in-
tervention in Afghanistan to oust al-Qaeda and their Taliban allies, and was used 
to justify the invasion to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The US traced terrorist 
attacks in East Africa and Yemen and the planning of  9/11 to southern Afghani-
stan. For the last five years, Washington has viewed American and international 
efforts to ensure the security and recovery of  Afghanistan as indispensable to 
prevent the country from again becoming a radical Islamic state hospitable to 
terrorists. 
Although Pakistan was an ardent supporter of  the War on Terror since its very 
beginning, many in Washington still doubt Pakistan’s capacity and determination 
to meet her commitments. Realistically, without the active participation of  Paki-
stan, the future of  Operation Enduring Freedom seems bleak. Untamed jihadist 
organizations and tribal groups are believed to have made common cause with 
al-Qaeda and aided the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. The limited progress 
1 Christopher Hill, The Foreign Politics of  Foreign Policy, New York, NY, 200, p. 176.
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made in reforming madressah education evidences Pakistan’s role as a breeding 
ground for extremists. Iran has been accused of  sponsoring terrorism through its 
support of  militant movements in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Leba-
non. Similarly, many believe that Bashar’s Syria aids radical groups. 
Political rivalry among powers in East Asia has become quite intense. The United 
States, Japan, China and Russia have divergent security and defense objectives 
and goals. Japan and the United States do not share similar goals for East Asia 
either. Japan’s territorial claims and disputes with South Korea regarding the Ta-
kashima islands, and with Russia regarding the Kuriles islands put it in a different 
mind set than the US. Japan plays mostly an economic role. Her political, defense, 
and strategic actions are much weaker than that of  the US. In addition, Taiwan 
further complicates Sino-US relations.
The Korean peninsula remains divided since the outbreak of  the Korean War 
(1951–5), and continues to reflect the atmosphere of  the Cold War. The two 
Koreas, Japan, the United States, Russia and China are still struggling to achieve 
their respective goals in Northeast Asia and to make security arrangements in 
Southeast Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific region.
In reality, ASEAN countries do not want to have to choose between the United 
States, Russia and China. They want to involve all the great powers in regional 
Rafeh Malik from Pakistan
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interdependencies and institutions in order to promote moderation on the part 
of  the big actors. However, China took a leadership role in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum,2 and both Russia and China have become more assertive and less def-
erential to Washington, forming new political and economic alignments. Both 
are particularly anxious to keep the US from maintaining too much leverage in 
Asia, especially in their traditional spheres of  influence. The Shanghai Coop-
eration Organization (SCO) has emerged as a challenger to the United States. 
Formed as an anti-terrorist organization that included all of  the Central Asian 
Islamic states except for Turkmenistan, the SCO has evolved into a political and 
economic agenda that favors the gradual withdrawal of  American forces from 
the region. Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia and India have observer status in the SCO. 
Other regional groupings have seen some revitalization, such as SAARC and the 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Their meetings have stressed the 
importance of  confidence building and economic growth. States have joined in 
new bilateral agreements, though most projects remain unfulfilled. Moreover, de-
spite their common ground on many issues, most regimes in the region hold on 
to their suspicions of  one another.
Horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation has become another significant 
development in the current strategic environment of  the region. Although the 
international community acknowledges India and Pakistan as de facto members 
of  the nuclear club, it remains apprehensive since these two states continue to 
act as bitter adversaries, conceivably embarking on an arms race. In 1999 during 
the Kargil crisis and again in the military buildup of  2001/2002, New Delhi and 
Islamabad were heading towards nuclear war. Fortunately, reason prevailed on 
both sides and they were able to control the escalation of  the crisis. The nuclear 
conflict between India and Pakistan has had a destabilizing impact on the entire 
world economy because both states lie on the Indian Ocean. A military show-
down between them in the Arabian Sea or in other adjacent areas would severely 
affect the safety of  sea passage from the Strait of  Hormuz (Iran-Oman) and the 
Strait of  Malacca (Indonesia-Malaysia). Peace and the free flow of  trade through 
the Indian Ocean are not only in the interest of  coastal and hinterland states in 
the region, but also in the interest of  the entire world.
By 2006, the booming narcotics trade in Afghanistan produced over ninety per-
cent of  the world’s supply of  heroin. Although the US is not the prime market 
2 Winberg Chai, The Ideological Paradigm Shifts of  China’s World Views: From Marxist-Leninism-Maoism to the Prag-
matism-Multilateralism of  the Deng-Jiang-Hu Era, in: Asian Affairs an American Review, No. /200, p. 169.
 See the article by Natalia Touzovskaia in this book.
 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Nuclear Capable Navies of  India and Pakistan: Impact on the Strategic Environment of  the 
Indian Ocean, in: IPRI Journal (Islamabad), No. 1/200.
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for Afghanistan’s heroin, it shares a deep concern about the flourishing drug 
trade with Europe and other states in the region. Washington and other capitals 
have started to feel the corrosive societal effects of  these exports, and its cor-
rupting influence has had a detrimental effect on the governance of  Afghanistan. 
The likelihood that drug trafficking also fuels the country’s mounting insurgency 
has intensified the dedication on the part of  the US to disable the heroin market. 
To date, the US has spent over $750 million a year in what has so far been a los-
ing battle to bring the drug trade under control. International efforts to eradicate 
the poppy crop have been counter-productive since they have alienated large 
sections of  the rural population and allowed the Taliban to reassume their role as 
the protector of  farmers, whose livelihood relies on the stable market for poppies.
The preceding discussion proves that strategic competition as well as inter- and 
intra-state conflicts have not only been holding Asia back, but could potentially 
have disastrous consequences for the entire world. Optimism for the develop-
ment of  the Asian community requires that their leadership sufficiently resolve 
these puzzles so that Asia’s future will not resemble her past. Instead of  sliding 
into anarchy or falling back into pre-Westphalian hierarchy, Asia has the potential 
to manage its insecurity and ensure its prosperity through shared regional norms, 
rising economic interdependencies, and growing institutional partnerships. Im-
proved performance of  associations like SAARC and ASEAN certainly enhance 
the economic interdependency and generate trust among member states. This 
would help replace enmity with amity between Asian states.
The strengthened economies in Asia and the global competition for energy 
resources have added a new dimension to international relations. Washington’s 
policies have been forced to accommodate an increasingly economically powerful 
China as well as India’s fast growing, diversifying economy. American policy has 
tried to balance criticism of  China’s trade and human rights policies with eco-
nomic motivation because of  the US’s extensive commercial relations and China’s 
huge dollar accounts. US foreign policy decisions in the Middle East remain 
devoted to insuring secure sources of  oil and to defending friendly oil-producing 
countries. China’s rapidly expanding economy puts it in even greater competition 
with the US for future oil and gas reserves. Since abandoning important sectors 
of  its formerly static economy, India has enhanced its own economic oppor-
tunities and prompted rapidly expanding strategic partnerships. Russia has also 
emerged as a competitor for the Asian energy market in the development and 
distribution of  resources.
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While the US has usually been satisfied to conduct state-to-state relations, public 
attitudes towards American policies and policy makers have become increas-
ingly unfavorable. Washington has expressed concern about the broad and deep 
antipathy toward American policies that has spread throughout the Asian public. 
Though a little less in India and Japan, surveys have generally shown a visible gap 
between the opinion of  the ruling elites and the general population. Washington 
has gradually come to recognize the mounting constraints on its governmental 
policy makers. Even if  no long-term allies have broken with the US, national 
leaders have been motivated to raise the price of  their cooperation with the US. 
But rather than reexamining its policies, Washington has for the most part viewed 
this issue as a public relations challenge, and still seeks to win a better hearing for 
American foreign policy.
In terms of  strategic stability, members of  ASEAN have constructed a durable 
security regime, the ARF that has allowed them to solve and demilitarize a variety 
of  disputes between them.5 Based on the ASEAN experience, the ARF contends 
that sustainable dialogue can produce measurable improvements in political 
relationships. It provides a setting in which members can discuss current regional 
security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security 
in the region. The ARF is characterized by consensus-based decision-making and 
minimal institutionalization.
The ARF: A Forum for Strategic Dialogue
The participants of  the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial 
Conference, held in Singapore on July 2rd–25th, 199, agreed to establish the 
ASEAN Regional Forum. The inaugural meeting of  the ARF was held in Bangkok 
on July 25th, 199. In 199, the first ARF meeting brought together foreign minis-
ters from Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, 
Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic 
of  Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the USA and Vietnam. The ARF draws 
together 2 countries, which influence the security of  the Asia Pacific Region. It is 
comprised of  the ten ASEAN member states (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, In-
donesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), the ten 
ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, Republic of  Korea, Russia and the United States), one ASEAN observer 
(Papua New Guinea), as well as the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea 
(DPRK), Mongolia and Pakistan. East Timor was admitted to the ARF in 2005.
5 Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, Rethinking East Asian Security, in: Survival, No. 2/199, p. 11.
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In a region with little history of  security cooperation, the ASEAN Regional 
Forum has become the main forum for conducting security dialogue in Asia. The 
ARF complements the various bilateral alliances and dialogues, which underpin 
the region’s security architecture. It fosters constructive dialogue and consultation 
on political and social issues of  common interest, and makes significant contribu-
tions to confidence-building measures. The 1995 ARF Concept Paper set out a 
three-stage evolutionary approach to the development of  the ARF, moving from 
confidence building to preventive diplomacy and towards conflict resolution 
capability in the long term.6
In its first ten years, the ARF has made modest gains in building a sense of  
strategic community. More recently, it has contributed to the region’s counter-ter-
rorism work. However, efforts to develop tools of  preventive diplomacy and 
conflict management are still at an early stage. While the ARF continues to focus 
on confidence-building measures, its members have also agreed that preventive 
diplomacy should proceed parallel to these efforts, particularly in areas where 
these two initiatives overlap.
As a preventive diplomacy tool, ARF members have also agreed to enhance the 
role of  the ARF chair in coordinating ARF positions to strengthen the organi-
6 ARF (Second ARF Ministerial Meeting), A Concept Paper, 18 March 1995, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/statements/
arf2conc.html>.
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zation’s ability to respond to situations affecting the security of  ARF members 
during the period between Ministerial meetings. Another mechanism is an ARF 
Register of  Experts and Eminent Persons, which, when operational, will provide 
a pool of  expertise on regional security issues that may be useful for the ARF 
chair or individual ARF members.
Recommendations for the Success of the ARF
The ARF’s role in promoting Asian strategic stability could be significant if  a 
number of  issues are taken into account. The resolution of  the following matters 
would improve ARF’s effectiveness and enhance its credibility in both the Asian 
strategic environment and world politics in general. A successful ARF requires 
the active participation and cooperation of  all participants. ASEAN must always 
be sensitive to and take into account the interests and concerns of  all ARF par-
ticipants.
The defense ministers of  ARF member countries should hold regular meetings 
aimed at encouraging dialogue for peace and security in the region by discussing 
various problems including defense policies, arms control, and disarmament.
ARF member countries should create a cooperative system for the exchange of  
information concerning drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. Although 
member states agreed to strengthen cooperation to combat terrorism at an ARF 
meeting on July 0th, 2002, there remains a lack of  realistic bilateral or multilat-
eral steps for curbing these menaces.
Periods of  rapid growth are often accompanied by significant shifts in power re-
lations. This can lead to conflict. The ARF will have to manage these transitions 
carefully to preserve peace. ARF should recognize and accept different approach-
es to peace and security and try to forge a consensual approach to security issues. 
The region experiences residual tension with regards to unresolved territorial 
and other matters of  contention. Any of  these could spark a conflagration that 
could undermine peace and prosperity in the region. Over time ARF will have to 
temper these potential problems.
The ARF should tackle these challenges through a gradual approach using con-
fidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution mecha-
nisms. In promoting confidence building, the ARF may adopt two approaches. 
The first approach derives from the experience of  ASEAN, which provides 
7 East Asian Strategic Review 200 (The National Institute for Defense Studies), Tokyo, June 200, p. 22.
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the ARF with a valuable guide that has proven its own capabilities. ASEAN has 
succeeded in reducing tensions among its member states, promoting regional 
cooperation, and creating a regional climate conducive to peace and prosperity. 
The second approach will be to implement the above-mentioned measures, which 
ARF participants can explore and implement in the immediate future, and also 
make proposals, which they can employ in the long term. These models could 
also aid the Track Two Process in the immediate future.
The ARF must develop its own mechanism to practice preventive diplomacy and 
conflict resolution. In doing so, the ARF will face quite a lot of  challenges. There 
are no established roads or procedures for it to follow. Without a high degree of  
confidence among ARF participants, it is unlikely that they will agree to establish 
mechanisms perceived to be intrusive or autonomous. This is a political reality 
that the ARF should recognize. However, it would be useful in the initial phase 
of  the Track Two Process to consider and investigate a variety of  preventive 
diplomacy and conflict resolution mechanisms. This preventive diplomacy would 
follow confidence-building measures. Conflict resolution should be an eventual 
goal that ARF participants must pursue as they begin to develop the ARF as a 
vehicle for promoting regional peace and stability.
Conclusion
ARF participants assume that the ARF will be a success. But the experiences of  
regional organizations like ASEAN show that success results from hard work 
and careful adherence to the rule of  consensus. ARF participants will have to 
work equally hard and be equally sensitive to ensure that the ARF process stays 
on track. Moreover, a great deal of  innovation and ingenuity will be required to 
keep the ARF moving forward while at the same time ensuring the support of  
its diverse participants. This is a major challenge for the ASEAN countries and 
other ARF participants. The UN Secretary-General’s “Agenda for Peace” has 
recognized that “just as no two regions are the same, so the design of  coopera-
tive work and its division of  labor must adjust to the realities of  each case with 
flexibility and creativity.”
8 General Secretary of  the UN, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, 
A/7/277 - S/2111, 17 June 1992, <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>, here: paragraph #62.
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Regional Security in the Middle East: Cooperation between 
Multinational and Regional Actors?
Mohamed Ibrahim
Since the second Gulf  War and the peace process between Arab countries and Is-
rael in 1991, regional dynamics in the Middle East have shaken the security of  the 
region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israeli-Syrian conflict, as well as the 
proliferation of  Weapons of  Mass Destruction (WMD) have had direct impact 
on the regional security of  the Middle East. Furthermore, after the terror attacks 
in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, global terrorism has been 
perceived as the main threat to the Western World. The United States as well as 
the European Union declared that the biggest threat came from the Middle East. 
To fight this threat, European and US politicians emphasized the need for de-
mocratization and reforms in the Middle East. They contended that the imple-
mentation of  these reforms would bring about regional security. But why regional 
security in the Middle East still has not become a reality? This paper makes the 
assumption that regional security will only be achieved by solving the Israeli-Arab 
conflict since this issue has the most imminent impact on regional security in the 
Middle East. Another assumption is that the Israeli-Arab conflict can be solved 
through intensive cooperation between multinational and regional actors. The 
Israeli-Arab conflict will only be solved when peace between Israel and the Pales-
tinians is realized. This paper will discuss new regional dynamics since the second 
Gulf  War, its implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as different 
multinational and regional initiatives and the reasons for their failure. It further 
suggests that the chance for a lasting peace between Palestinians and Israelis has 
a much greater chance if  multinational actors cooperate with a potential regional 
power like Turkey. Such a peace agreement would promote stability in the Middle 
East.
Regional Dynamics since the Second Gulf War and their Effects  
on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The peace process in the mid-1990s has changed the political and economic 
relationship of  Arab countries with Israel. Before the Oslo Agreement in 199, 
Egypt was the only Arab nation maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel. 
Since it signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1978 in Camp David, it was con-
sequently excluded from the Arab League. Although the Oslo Agreement justi-
1 Cf. Anthony H. Cordesman. Iraq and “After”: Rethinking the Major Policy Issues in the Wider Middle East (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies – CSIS), Washington, DC, 6.7.200, p. 21.
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fied official diplomatic relations between Arab countries and Israel, the escalating 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict still has direct implications on Arab-Israeli cooperation. 
No other conflict has bothered the Arab League more than the Israeli-Palestinian 
one. The final agreement between Palestinians and Israelis is in principle accepted 
by both parties: a two state solution, evacuation of  most Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank, Jerusalem as the capital for both sides, and limited return of  Palestin-
ian refugees to Israel. The Palestinian government under Hamas implicitly ac-
cepts the idea of  a two state solution by offering Israel a long-term cease-fire in 
exchange for the implementation of  the above-mentioned conditions.2
The Oslo Agreement:
The first official dialogue between Arab countries and Israel took place at the 
Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. This conference paved the way for direct ne-
gotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, which then led to the Oslo Agree-
ment in 199. The Oslo Agreement stated that final status negotiations should 
start after a five-year period. Unfortunately, the conflict escalated in the mid-90s 
and the Oslo Agreement failed. Israel expanded its settlements, which the Pal-
estinians considered and continue to consider a major obstacle for a potential 
Palestinian state. Israel, on the other hand, was still waiting for the security it was 
claiming. In addition to these major factors, the negotiations between the Pal-
estinians and Israelis were conducted without any US or EU engagement. The 
failure of  the Oslo Agreement lies in the fact that multinational and regional 
actors did not accompany the conflicting parties during the implementation 
phase. Although the international community provided intensive development aid 
to the Palestinians, the important issues that affected the daily life of  the people 
were postponed for the final status agreement.5 Multinational actors should have 
accompanied the conflicting parties on the ground, e. g. the inclusion of  multina-
tional observers within the joint Israeli-Palestinian security controls, in order to 
ensure that both parties complied with the agreed agenda. Without external help, 
a peace agreement between the two parties lies out of  reach.
2 “Hamas Officials Already Recognize Israel’s Right to Exist, Apparently”: Prime Minister Ismail Haniya: “If  Israel with-
draws to the 1967 borders, peace will prevail and we will implement a cease-fire [hudna] for many years.” Published in: 
News Center (CommonDreams.org), May 1st, 2006, <http://www.commondreams.org/views06/051-2.htm>.
 Jordan (the Palestinians were part of  the Jordanian delegation), Lebanon, Syria.
 A German version of  its text in: Angelika Volle / Werner Weidenfeld (Hrsg.), Frieden im Nahen Osten? Chancen, Ge-
fahren, Perspektiven. Beiträge und Dokumente aus Europa-Archiv und Internationale Politik, Bonn 1997, pp. 168–176.
5 These issues included Israeli settlements, the city of  Jerusalem, regional borders, Palestinian refugees, and access to 
water.
Regional Security  
in the Middle East

 
New Faces Conference 2006
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of  Ministers of  Foreign Affairs, held in 
Barcelona in 1995 only two years after the Oslo Agreement, marked the start-
ing point of  the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), a wide 
framework for political, economic and social relations between the member states 
of  the EU and partners of  the southern Mediterranean.6 The agreement aimed 
at establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010 and at creating a 
region of  peace, security and prosperity. Through the Barcelona Process, Europe 
seeks to promote democracy, political reforms and regional co-operation in the 
partner countries of  the EMP. Most governments in the Middle East, however, 
oppose these explicit goals. Thus, the efforts of  the EU to promote political 
reforms have become incompatible with the policy of  Arab governments, which 
seem willing to accept only reforms that do not question their authority. The Is-
raeli-Arab conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular are not a stated 
priority of  the Barcelona Process. It was not the explicit aim of  the Barcelona 
Process to focus on or solve the Israeli-Arab conflict. On the other hand, the 
Barcelona Process had and still has direct implications on the Israeli-Arab conflict 
and therefore deserves attention. Due to a growing number of  Jewish settlements 
6 The group of  nations included Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Lebanon, 
Turkey, Cyprus and Malta.
7 Cf. Muriel Asseburg, Die transatlantische Debatte über den »Broader Middle East« und die Erfahrungen des Barcelona 
Prozesses, Discussion Paper during the 12th SWP dialogue, October 12, 200, p. .
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in the West Bank, the Arab League called for a boycott of  Arab-Israeli relations 
at the European-Mediterranean Conference that took place in Malta in 1997. 
Furthermore, the Second Intifada in 2000 had a negative impact on the Barcelona 
Process.
The Roadmap
In April 200 the Middle East Quartet presented its “Roadmap” to the Palestin-
ian Authority and Israel, an initiative that should have led to a two state solution 
by 2005. Both conflicting parties had reservations and tried to push their own 
initiatives through, without any significant success. The plan consists of  three 
phases. In the first phase the Palestinians shall declare a cease-fire as well as 
acknowledge Israel’s right to exist. Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority must 
disarm Palestinian groups and proceed with political reforms. Israel is to stop the 
expansion of  settlements, evacuate those settlements built after March 2001 and 
withdraw its military forces from areas populated by Palestinians. The second 
phase is meant to start with Palestinian elections, an international conference, and 
the establishment of  a provisional Palestinian state. The third phase would then 
deal with all unsolved questions, e. g. regional borders, Jerusalem, the settlements 
as well as Palestinian refugees. The weakness of  the Roadmap is obvious. Like 
the Oslo Agreement, the most important issues would be negotiated only at the 
end of  the process. The agreement is not described in detail and only refers to 
well-known documents such as United Nations Resolutions 22 and 8.9 Mul-
tinational actors’ involvement in the Roadmap process is limited to observing its 
development on the international level. Even though an important instrument, 
international monitoring is not sufficient. The Roadmap is based on voluntary 
participation of  the conflicting parties. Any means of  international pressure or 
sanctions would constitute a breach of  the agreement.
One of  the main obstacles for the Roadmap to succeed is the fact that the con-
flicting parties have not been involved in the drafting process.  The most im-
portant issues, such as Israel’s security concerns, are not satisfactorily met in the 
agreement. On the other hand, Israel expected the Palestinians to give up their 
right of  return. The failure of  this initiative was inevitable.
8 USA, EU, Russia, UN.
9 The UN Security Council Resolution 22 calls for the withdrawal of  Israeli armed forces from territories occupied 
in the recent conflict; cf. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/20/9/IMG/NR0209.
pdf?OpenElement>. The UN Security Council Resolution 8 calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately 
after the cease-fire the implementation of  Security Council Resolution 22 in all of  its parts.
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The New Middle East after September 11, 2001
Immediately after the terror attacks in the USA, the Bush administration ac-
cused non-democratic countries of  promoting terror and therefore endangering 
the Western World. In order to fight this terror, the administration attempted to 
use military force coupled with political reforms. From this perspective, the war 
against the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as the war against Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in Iraq was meant to produce regional security in the Middle East. With 
the “Forward Strategy for Freedom”10 authoritarian regimes should be “guided” 
in the process of  liberalization and democratization. After controversial negotia-
tions between the US government and the EU concerning the use of  military 
force, the US government modified its plan for a “Greater Middle East.” Any 
subsequent modifications could not hide the weakness of  the plan. The Greater 
Middle East Initiative was created by the US government and later modified by 
the EU, but the countries of  the Middle East were not included in the negotia-
tions. Therefore, yet another initiative was bound to fail.
Both the EMP as well as the Greater Middle East Initiative do not mention the 
Israeli-Arab conflict as a priority. However, the Greater Middle East Initiative had 
and still has direct implications on the regional security of  the Middle East. Ku-
wait was the only Arab country which officially supported the regime change in 
Iraq. The smaller countries of  the Gulf  as well as Jordan indirectly supported the 
war led by the US. These countries are becoming increasingly important for geo-
political strategy, especially that of  the United States. The countries of  the Gulf  
as well as Israel gained more importance in the Middle East after the war. The 
Israeli fear of  being attacked from the East has been unfounded since the war 
against Iraq. Since the war, countries like Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have lost 
political power in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has been accused of  promot-
ing terror, mainly by the US. Almost all assassins of  the 9/11 attacks were Saudi 
Arabian citizens. Saudi Arabia is currently trying to get back its former standing 
towards the West but still suffers from the accusations of  the West. Egypt has 
strongly opposed the attempts the US has made to promote reform in the region. 
While Egypt wants to sustain its support of  the US with regard to the war against 
terror, it is fighting terror in its own country and fears that the enactment of  
political reforms would incite Islamic terrorism, which would lead to an unstable 
situation in Egypt and the whole region. The September 11 terror attacks have 
posed great challenges to regional security in the Middle East.
10 Fact Sheet: President Bush Calls for a “Forward Strategy of  Freedom” to Promote Democracy in the Middle East, 
The White House, Washington, DC, 26.11.200, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200/11/2001106-
11.html>.
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As stated above, the Israeli-Arab conflict was not a priority for the “Greater 
Middle East Initiative.” But the US government contended that the implementa-
tion of  this initiative would resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict. This assumption 
seems unrealistic since both the Greater Middle East Initiative as well as the EMP 
appear to Middle Eastern nations as a Western attempt to gain more influence 
in the region. Unless the desired reforms come from within the region itself, the 
“Greater Middle East Initiative” will fail.
Potential Regional Actors in the Middle East
Since the above-mentioned multinational initiatives failed in their attempts to 
provide regional security in the Middle East, the search for other approaches is 
pressing. One proposed solution is to include at least one regional actor in the 
Middle East in the development of  future initiatives. Turkey is such a potential 
regional power.
Turkey as a potential regional actor in the Israeli-Arab conflict
The end of  the Cold World War in 1989 decreased Turkey’s geopolitical impor-
tance in the Middle East. NATO was in the process of  closing military bases 
when suddenly the second Gulf  War paved the way for Turkey’s new role in the 
Middle East:
· military bases serving the war in Iraq;
· political and economic bridge to ethnic Turks in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan;
· stronghold against Islamic fundamentalism;
· means of  accessing oil and natural resources at the Caspian Sea.
Due to this new understanding, NATO as well as the EU describe Turkey as an 
important ally. Turkey’s interests in the region are compatible with those of  the 
international powers and have led to increased cooperation with Turkey. The ter-
ror attacks of  September 11th brought international powers closer to Turkey. The 
new Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East became clear when Turkey stood 
on the allies’ side during and after the second Gulf  War. Turkey also intensified 
its cooperation with Israel during the mid 90s. In 1996, both countries signed a 
military agreement. Despite this close cooperation, Turkey also has close political 
and economic ties with its Arab neighbors. Due to its cultural and religious roots, 
Turkey is part of  the Islamic world. But in regard to the Israeli-Arab conflict, 
Turkey is the only regional power which maintains a close relationship with both 
conflicting parties.
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This paper assumes that regional security is possible by solving the Israeli-Arab 
conflict through the implementation of  a long lasting peace agreement between 
Palestinians and Israelis. Multinational and regional powers must work together 
to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As stated above, Palestinians and Israelis 
have in principle accepted the framework of  a final status agreement. It is now 
time for negotiations between a multinational actor, like the Middle East Quar-
tet, the conflicting parties and a regional power like Turkey. The Arab Summit in 
Beirut in 2002 made an extensive offer for a long lasting peace between all Arab 
countries and Israel.  It called for all Arab countries to sign an immediate peace 
agreement with Israel, acknowledging Israel’s right to exist. Israel would have to 
withdraw from all territories occupied in 1967 and a Palestinian state would be 
established. There are two main reasons why Israel ignored this offer. First of  all, 
Israel did not trust the Beirut offer of  the Arab League. Second, this offer did 
not meet Israel’s security interests. Due to Turkey’s good relations with Israel, its 
role as a regional power can actively contribute to Israel’s security when it comes 
to a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Turkey can become a 
bridge-builder in the region since it enjoys trust on both conflicting sides. How-
ever, Turkey’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be envisioned within a 
broader US and EU involvement. Due to the US-Israeli relationship, Israel may 
only accept a peace agreement that would include the US. On the other hand, 
NATO cannot serve as a multinational power in a Middle East peace initiative 
since the Arab world considers NATO to be a purely western institution. The sit-
Israeli-Palestinian encounter and dialogue during the NFC
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uation in Afghanistan demonstrates this perception. If  Turkey became a member 
of  the EU, it could not maintain its role as a regional power with good relations 
to both conflicting parties. Other regional actors would question Turkey’s role as 
a regional power, since the country would be perceived as part of  the West. It is 
also important to mention that thus far no common EU foreign policy towards 
the region exists. This does not only apply to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As 
long as peace agreements do not result from cooperation between multinational 
actors and regional powers, security in the region will be difficult to realize.
This paper shows that one of  the most important reasons for the failure of  
achieving regional security in the Middle East was the mistrust among conflicting 
parties. Turkey as a Muslim country with good diplomatic ties with the western 
world in general and Israel in particular could contribute to sustainable regional 
security in the Middle East. Turkey should not only mediate between Palestinians 
and Israelis. Turkey is the only regional power in the Middle East which could 
also give Israel the confidence that her security would not be endangered in case 
of  a peace accord.
Karim Makdisi with emotional statements from Beirut, just weeks after the 2nd Israel-Lebanon War
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Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:  
The Emerging EU Alternative
Stuart Reigeluth
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires the international intervention of  a third 
party. The multinational force deployed to southern Lebanon is viewed as a pos-
sible precedent for international intervention in the Gaza Strip. A parallel could 
be drawn between the “Lebanon model” and the creation of  a security buffer 
between Israel and the Palestinians, but the circumstances on the ground in 
southern Lebanon are different from those in the Palestinian territories. Since the 
“question of  Palestine” remains pivotal to the resolution of  the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, the deployment of  an international force to the Palestinian territories should 
therefore not be contingent upon the outcome of  the UN/multinational force in 
southern Lebanon. The EU offers the best alternative for third party intervention 
in the Palestinian territories. Though the risks are high for the credibility of  the 
EU, the launching of  an initial military mission, a “Battle Group” of  1,500–2,000 
troops, could bring about the cessation of  Israeli-Palestinian hostilities, thus pro-
viding security for Israel and stability for the Palestinians.
Third Party Context
The Quartet (US, EU, UN, Russia) Roadmap has been derailed and bilateral nego-
tiations suspended. The democratic recognition for armed resistance acquired by 
the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has not facilitated dialogue with Israel. 
Consequently, the international financial embargo and Israeli military operations 
remain in effect. After the 2006 Lebanon War, international analysts agreed that 
Israel waged the war to restore a degree of  military deterrence on its northern 
front. The same desire for deterrence against the launching of  Palestinian “Qas-
sam” missiles applies to the repeated Israeli operations against the Gaza Strip. As 
a result of  the Lebanon War, the deployment of  a multinational force reinforces 
the UNIFIL mandate and ability to create a security buffer in southern Lebanon. 
In the Palestinian territories, Ehud Olmert’s “convergence” plan – unilateral with-
drawal – is being seriously reconsidered. A synchronized Israeli withdrawal with a 
similar third party “security buffer” deployment in the Palestinian territories could 
become a possibility. Similar to Hizballah in southern Lebanon, once the resis-
1 In reference to the 2006 Lebanon War, Robert Malley claims that the 2006 Lebanon War was a “war waged to reassert 
Israel’s power of  deterrence,” and simultaneously that “greater international attention will mean more intense inter-
national involvement.” See Malley, A New Middle East, in: New York Review of  Books, September 21, 2006. Muriel 
Asseburg agrees that the 2006 Lebanon War was carried out with the goal of  “re-establishing an effective deterrent.” 
See Asseburg, An International Force for Lebanon?, Comments 20 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – SWP, Berlin), 
August 2006.
Stuart Reigeluth
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tance rationale is resolved, Hamas will have no incentive to maintain an armed 
militia or to become part of  a unified Palestinian security force. As international 
momentum grows, now is an opportune time for third party intervention.2
Third party intervention is not a new concept. Martin Indyk proposed a US-led 
third party in the Palestinian territories. Following the Israeli disengagement 
from the Gaza Strip in August/September 2005, the EU deployed a civilian 
mission, EU BAM-Rafah, to monitor the passage of  goods and people through 
the Rafah Crossing Point. Other clauses have yet to be fulfilled as part of  the 
Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) signed by Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority (PA). During the international deployment to southern Lebanon, PA 
President Mahmoud Abbas called for the intervention of  an international body 
resembling the one in Lebanon. Abbas also stated that this international force 
would be in agreement with the emergence of  a coalition Palestinian govern-
ment. Though historically adverse to third party intervention, Israel has been in-
creasingly receptive to the involvement of  a multinational force, as demonstrated 
in southern Lebanon. According to Yossi Alpher, this new receptiveness is due to 
the failure of  the “traditional solutions, both military (conquest and occupation) 
and diplomatic (bilateral peace processes),”5 and could be seen as a positive step 
towards resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. 
The EU Alternative
Considering that the US is embroiled in Iraq and NATO is entangled in Afghani-
stan, the Palestinians would perceive neither authority as impartial. Both would 
appear as a threat to Arab/Muslim regimes such as Syria and Iran, and would be 
equally targeted by militant Islamist groups.6 The other option would be a multi-
national force sponsored by the UN flag, but the legitimacy of  the UN has been 
severely eroded since the 200 Iraq War. The international inability to enforce 
UN Security Council Resolutions has been most perceptible with respect to Israel. 
The unilateral US veto to halt hostilities in the Gaza Strip as well as the postpone-
2 With the support of  France and Italy, Spain initiated a call for a European peace plan for the Middle East, which 
would include five points demarcated by Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, including the deploy-
ment of  international observers and / or a military mission to the Gaza Strip. See Peru Egurbide, España, Francia e Ita-
lia impulsan un plan europeo de paz para Oriente Medio, in: El País, November 17, 2006; Zapatero propone, Opinión, 
in: El País, November 17, 2006; and, Europe in Middle East Push, Al-Jazeera.net, November 17, 2006.
 Martin Indyk, A Trusteeship for Palestine?, in: Foreign Affairs, May–June 200, pp. 51–66.
 Yoav Stern, Abbas Calls for International Force in PA as Part of  New Government Plan, in: Haaretz, August 1st, 
2006; Yoav Stern, PA Unity Government Could Ask for International Force, in: Haaretz, September 1st, 2006.
5 Yossi Alpher, Toward Trusteeship?, in: Bitterlemons, A Lebanon-style International Force?, September 18, 2006, über: 
<http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/>.
6 The public intentions of  deploying European Member State soldiers to southern Lebanon to provide security for Is-
rael, as proclaimed by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, arose much controversy and instigated angry Lebanese 
responses. See Lebanon’s Top Shi’ite Cleric: UN Force only Protects Israel, in: Haaretz, October 16, 2006.
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ment of  a prompt diplomatic resolution to the 2006 Lebanon War further eroded 
the legitimacy of  the UN. The UN/multinational force in southern Lebanon 
should therefore not be replicated in the Palestinian territories. For lack of  a bet-
ter option, the EU now presents the best alternative for third party intervention 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Due to geographic proximity and common security, the Middle East has become 
the most important region for EU foreign policy. The 2006 Lebanon War caused 
a sudden and fundamental change in the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). Joschka Fischer considers that an initiative to deploy militarily in the 
Middle East lies in the interest of  EU Member States. The current dilemma is 
that the EU does not have an effectively unified common foreign policy and its 
actions remain determined by national interests, as demonstrated by the deploy-
ment of  national contingencies under the UN flag.9 Though France initiated the 
deployment to southern Lebanon and transferred the leadership to Italy, incre-
mental synergies should be encouraged between Member State contingencies 
rather than representative competition.10
Spain and Italy present such symbolic competition. In the wake of  the US-led 
invasion of  Iraq in 200, the Socialist Party (PSOE) ascended to power in Spain, 
and José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero rapidly withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq. 
Romano Prodi, recently gaining electoral recognition for the Italian Socialist Party, 
has also called for an imminent withdrawal of  Italian troops from Iraq. Ironically, 
both EU Member States may be at as great a risk by legally deploying in south-
ern Lebanon, just as they were when they deployed illegally in Iraq. Referring to 
UNSC Resolution 1701, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number-two of  al-Qaeda, stated 
“the international peacekeeping force now deploying in southern Lebanon are 
‘enemies of  Islam.’” As France steps down from its colonial legacy in Lebanon, 
both Spain and Italy are asserting themselves in acting as peace-keepers/-mak-
ers in southern Lebanon. Both EU member states also play large roles in the two 
EU civilian missions (EUPOL-COPPS and EU BAM-Rafah) in the Palestinian 
territories.
Echoing the Palestinian demand for a replication of  the international force in 
southern Lebanon, Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D’Alema called for the 
7 See Richard Falk, The UN After Lebanon, in: The Nation, October 2nd, 2006.
8 Joschka Fischer, Europa cruza el Rubicón, in: El País, September 5, 2006, p. 1.
9 See Denis MacShane, Europe is Involved in Palestine, But not Coherently, in: The Daily Star, November 1, 2006. 
10 La première fois, l’Europe peut jouer un rôle actif  au Proche-Orient, in: Le Monde, August 25, 2006.
 Richard Beeston, Al-Qaeda Threatens New Terror Offensive against Gulf  States, in: The Times, September 12, 2006. 
UNIFIL II forces will not be targeted by Hezbollah but rather by extremist Sunni Muslim groups. See Robert Fisk, 
Conflict in Middle East is Mission Implausible, in: The Independent, November 15, 2006.
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deployment of  an international force in the Gaza Strip.12 A proper EU approach 
should now be based on the common interest for security in coordination with 
the Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (currently Marc 
Otte) via EU Council High Representative, Javier Solana. Member States could 
contribute national contingencies to EU “Battle Groups” rather than contin-
gencies beneath the UN flag. The difference is subtle, but important: instead of  
promulgating a national Member State force, each individual member state could 
contribute to a common EU effort. The EU can use this as an opportunity to 
develop a “coherent foreign policy toward the Middle East” based on a common 
defense and security policy, repudiating the power politics of  military force, and 
defined by multilateral consent between engaging parties.
Instead of  an UN / multinational force led by one member state (as in southern 
Lebanon), the EU now has the capability to deploy a “Battle Group” of  1,500-
2,000 soldiers. This may not be sufficient to secure the Gaza-Israel border and 
certainly not the West Bank. However, an initial Battle Group could be reinforced 
by subsequent Battle Groups once the EU has the capability to deploy over ten 
such groups with the operational ability “to undertake two simultaneous mis-
sions.” The deployment of  a Battle Group would also revamp the EU civilian 
missions operating in the Palestinian territories. Subsequently, the EU monitoring 
role at Rafah Crossing Point could expand to include monitoring the other cross-
ing points along the Gaza-Israel border, as well as along the Jordan-Palestine bor-
der. Simultaneously, EUPOL-COPPS could reinitiate the training of  a Palestinian 
Civil Police force. This may be opposed by Israel because it may eventually lead 
to the formation of  a Palestinian National Army. However, Israel could accept 
the emergence of  a Palestinian National Army if  the “burden of  responsibility” 
were transferred to the surveillance and guidance of  an international third party 
force.15 Mentioning the emergence of  a Palestinian National Army seems none-
theless premature if  the Palestinians do not have a nation. International inter-
vention must therefore be conditioned on mutual bilateral political commitment 
based on the parameters for a final settlement between Israel and the PA.
12 Meron Rapoport, Italian FM: Harsh U.S. Approach to Mideast Failed, in: Haaretz, August 25, 2006.
 See Álvaro de Vasconcelos, A European Force: What For?, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – Instituto de Estudos 
Estratégicos e Internacionais, Berlin / Lissabon 2006. Alvaro de Vasconcelos argues that the successful emergence of  a 
common EU foreign policy will depend on “whether the force emanates from Europe’s defence policy or whether it is 
the result of  a coalition led by one member state.”
 See The EU Battle Groups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell (European Union Fact Sheet), February, 2005; “Bat-
tle Groups” to strengthen EU military crisis management?, in: European Security Review (ISIS Europe), April 200; 
Markus Kaim, EU Battle Groups and Civilian Headline Goal – ESDP Targets, in: Volker Perthes / Stefan Mair (eds.), 
European Foreign and Security Policy, Challenges and Opportunities for the German EU Presidency (SWP Research 
Papers; RP 10/2006), Berlin, October 2006, pp. 19–22. 
15 Israel’s Political Options Vis-à-vis the Palestinians (Reut Institute, Tel Aviv), November 16, 2006, p. 7.
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Political Commitment 
European military engagement should be accompanied by political commitment. 
To reinforce the multinational military presence, the EU may take certain political 
initiatives: 
1) Act as an impartial third party mediator, assist in the consolidation of  a 
coalition PA government, including elements of  the democratically elected 
Hamas and remnants of  Fatah.
2) Push for Palestinian acquiescence to the three conditions demanded by 
Israel: recognition of  Israel, renunciation of  violence, and acceptance to 
previous agreements between the PA and Israel; on the condition that Israel 
also respect the previous agreements, namely the Paris Protocol (199) and 
the Agreement on Movement and Access (2005).
) Create confidence between the PA and the Government of  Israel. The EU 
Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (Marc Otte) would 
willingly act as intermediary between the conflicting parties.
) Expand the sectors of  implementation for foreign funds via the Temporary 
International Mechanism (TIM) to include schools and universities, hospitals 
and clinics, companies and clients.
5) Exert diplomatic pressure on Israel to return the monthly tax and customs 
revenues to the PA as stipulated by the 199 Paris Protocol within the Oslo 
Stuart Reigeluth on Third Party Intervention
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Accord framework, and offer the reward of  shifting the security burden of  
responsibility to the EU Battle Groups.
6) Ensure a two-state solution via a long-term 15–20 year hudna, or “truce,” 
between the Palestinians and Israelis based on the pre-1967 borders (or the 
198 armistice line). The “convergence” plan is not set in stone. Small “out-
posts” can be incorporated within larger settlements, but these larger Jewish 
settlements can also be relocated within Israel proper (inside the demarca-
tion line of  198, prior to 1967), as a majority resides on Palestinian-owned 
land, or they could be swapped “for some equivalent territories in present-
day Israel.”16
Going for Gaza First?
The first and most attractive option for Israel is that an international force deploy 
in Gaza. There are preliminary advantages for Israel, the Palestinians, and the 
European Union:
1) Increase Israeli security in cities around the Gaza Strip, namely Ashdod, 
Askelon and Sderot. However, Israel must comprehend that eradicating the 
launching of  “Qassam” rockets will not occur instantaneously, but that given 
time and space to maneuver, a multinational force could gradually reduce the 
number of  missiles launched into Israel to zero. “Qassams” have generally 
had little impact on Israeli society or infrastructure, and have been employed 
by Israel as a reason to retaliate with excessive force. An international de-
ployment could thus help demonstrate that “Qassam” missiles are counter-
productive to Palestinian national aspirations and daily economic interests.
2) Provide security in the streets of  the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians must un-
derstand the need to ease the explosive frictions between opposing factions. 
An international force could provide calm by patrolling the streets of  Gaza 
City, Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah. Given enough credibility, this 
multinational force would provide the Palestinian National Unity Govern-
ment the breathing space needed to operate effectively, which Hamas has 
repeatedly claimed is also in its interest. In cooperation with the coalition 
PA government, the Palestinian security forces should include the emerging 
Presidential Guard (Fatah) and the Executive Force (Hamas) as well as incor-
porate militant wings of  respective groups, such as the most prominent two: 
the Izz al-Din al-Qassam (Hamas) and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Fatah). The 
deployment of  an international EU force should also be based on the condi-
tion that militias would be incorporated within a unified Palestinian civil po-
16 See Steven Erlanger, Israeli Maps says West Bank Posts Sit on Arab Land, in: The New York Times, November 21, 
2006; Henry Kissinger, What’s Needed From Hamas, in: The Washington Post, February 27, 2006. 
Third Party Intervention

 
New Faces Conference 2006
lice force, which could lead to the emergence of  a unified Palestinian armed 
force (similar to the multi-ethnic Lebanese Army) which would eventually 
replace the function of  the international force in patrolling the streets of  the 
Gaza Strip and the Gaza-Israel border (as well as the Gaza-Egypt border).
) Enhance the visibility and effectiveness of  the EU presence. The deploy-
ment of  a multinational force could provide the security mentioned and thus 
permit the full implementation of  the two EU civilian missions operating in 
the Palestinian territories: EUPOL-COPPS and EU BAM-Rafah. Both civil-
ian missions are currently suspended due to circumstances on the ground, 
but could easily be reinvigorated with adequate security measures in coordi-
nation with Israel and the Palestinians. The renewal of  full implementation 
would permit the passage of  people and goods in and out of  the Gaza Strip, 
thus assisting economic development. The creation of  jobs and the general 
rejuvenation of  the economy would decrease the incentive for individuals to 
carry out radical acts of  violence. Despite the risk of  failure, EU presence in 
support of  civilian missions via military intervention would strongly increase 
the image of  the EU in the Middle East.
The Gaza first option serves Israeli interests since it would relieve Israel of  
having to maintain a military presence within or around the Strip. However, to 
reduce militant threats, Israel would need to consent to the international de-
ployment of  troops on the Israeli side of  the border, as well as the opening of  
numerous crossing points between Israel and the Gaza Strip, such as Erez, Karni 
and Kerem Shalom. Refusing to do so will only frustrate European attempts to 
bring security to Israel and stability to the Palestinians. The EU military deploy-
ment must therefore be conditioned by Israeli willingness to allow the physical 
opening of  all respective crossing points to facilitate economic development. In 
turn, this may be in the interest of  Israel since it would decrease the incentive for 
militant Palestinian activity.
The Palestinians, however, would be highly reluctant to accept the Gaza first 
option because it would not include the other part of  what remains of  Palestine. 
Already separated geographically, politically, and legally, opting for Gaza first 
would split the Palestinian territories further. International intervention must 
therefore include final status conditions for the West Bank and Jerusalem, which 
are both substantially more complex and symbolic than the Gaza Strip. A final 
status settlement would have to include the question of  refugees, the status of  
Jerusalem, and the national borders between Israel and Palestine. The Palestinian 
 Camille Mansour, Not Without a Political Horizon, in: Bitterlemons, A Lebanon-style International Force?, September 
18th, 2006, über: <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/>.
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territories – the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem – must be treated as one 
for the third party mandate to be accepted by the Palestinians. If  not, the Pales-
tinians will perceive an international force as a surrogate for Israel.
Many contentious points remain, such as the Palestinian right of  return, the 
repatriation of  refugees, and the border delineation along the Israeli “security 
fence” or along the 198 armistice line. An international force would be deployed 
to ensure the total dismantling of  the “separation wall.” Territorial swaps could 
also ensure that the Palestinians retrieve a portion of  land proportional to the 
amount they lost in the war of  June 1967. Such a territorial swap would permit 
Israel to maintain some settlements in the West Bank in exchange for territory 
within Israel. All other Jewish settlements would be dismantled since they would 
be deemed illegal by international law. As consolidated by Israel prior to and dur-
ing the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Greater Jerusalem could subsequently 
become an international city as envisioned by the 197 UN partition plan. Ac-
quiring international status for the three “people of  the Book”—Christians, Jews, 
and Muslims—would be seen as a symbolic sign for religious reconciliation and 
political coexistence.
Conclusion
The EU offers a viable option for third party intervention in the Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict. Because of  its potential to compromise member state participation, 
this intervention should not be determined by the success level of  the UN/mul-
tinational task in southern Lebanon. Rather, it should be seen as a necessary 
prerequisite to paving the path for a final settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
From such a perspective, a longer-term EU peacekeeping mission could then 
substitute the rapid deployment of  a EU “Battle Group” of  1,500–2,000 Eu-
ropean Member State troops. The initial deployment to the Gaza-Israel border 
would provide the security demanded by Israel and the stability needed by the 
Palestinians, as well as create the possibility to implement fully the two EU civil-
ian missions in the Palestinian territories and the Agreement on Movement and 
Access signed by Israel and the PA. But as ever, the success of  the EU alterna-
tive depends on what Israel will refuse for security reasons and what Palestinians 
would accept as national territory.
 Ghassan Khatib, A Measure of  International Seriousness, in: Bitterlemons, A Lebanon-style International Force?, 
September 18th, 2006, über: <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/>.
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